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In Egypt, becoming a civic state that provides its citizens’ demands for 
“Bread, Freedom, Social Justice and Human Dignity” is a protracted 
process. a process that depends on many factors and actors. The nature 
of this process, whether democratic or otherwise, is a function of multiple 
forces and interests of local, national, regional and international scales. 
This study is an attempt to analyze and explain this process.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A. SUMMARY OF THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In Egypt, becoming a civic state that provides its citizens’ demands for 
“Bread, Freedom, Social Justice and Human Dignity” is a protracted 
process. A process that depends on many factors and actors. The na-
ture of this process, whether democratic or otherwise, is a function 
of multiple forces and interests of local, national, regional and inter-
national scales. This study is an attempt to analyze and explain this 
process.
Legions of scholars have established famous theories about the 
nature of the state in Egypt. For example, Karl Wittfogel’s theory of 
the hydraulic society argued how perennial agriculture necessitates a 
large bureaucracy, which in turn requires a despot on top to control, 
regulate and possibly, expand the empire. His Oriental Despotism was 
a famous reference to some historians (Ayubi, 1980) and continued 
to inform several analyses of the ruling regimes in Egypt for quite 
a while. Robert Springborg, for instance, characterized consecutive 
ruling regimes post the 1952 coup d’état that led to political inde-
pendence as hybrid authoritarianisms (Springborg, 2009). While all 
post-independence presidents came from the military ranks, those 
regimes were amalgams of military and secular dictatorships, with 
mixed political economies. 
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There is no doubt that those esteemed scholars had based their 
analyses and characterizations on valid evidences. Nevertheless, their 
arguments are variations upon ecological determinisms that posited 
Egypt’s geographical location and the River Nile as the ultimate de-
termining factors that configured the Egyptian statehood since times 
immemorial. The present study does not claim that such factors do 
not figure into the equation of the statei Egypt. They do. However, 
their relative importance fluctuates in response to other forces - or as 
this study claims - other vectors i.e. forces with measurable strengths 
and identifiable directions. 
What are the vectors that determine the relative importance of 
location and topography and eventually the nature of the state? This 
study identifies the main vector as Capital: private national capital, 
regional capital, transnational capital, as well as state capital. That 
is to say, there are multiple capitals – and, as will be duly shown be-
low, even state capital cannot be conceived of as a single homogenous 
capital, but as multiple capitals. The other vector is collective action 
and organized activism. Similar to Capital, there are multiple forms of 
collective action and organized activism. 
This anthropological study analyzes the dynamics between mul-
tiple state capitals and multiple forms of collective action immedi-
ately before and during the regime of the deposed president, Hosni 
Mubarak. The objective is to reveal how those vectors interacted and 
shaped the nature of the ruling regimes after the January 2011 upris-
ing. The study claims that just as we identify multiple forms of capitals 
and multiple collective actions, we also identify multiple states within 
the State. The possibility or impossibility of fulfilling the demands of 
‘the People’ reside in the potential strength of particular forms of col-
lective actions to continue their struggles against the agendas of mul-
tiple capitals, and of competing state institutions. These struggles will 
continue to re-invent the processes of democratic and civic statehood, 
but their outcomes are not foreseeable yet. We will continue to ask 
what Alexander & Bassiouny pose, “would the people remake the state 
in their image, or the state remake the people?” (2014, Kindle version) 
This sort of analysis is a bit difficult because both vectors (capitals 
and collective actions) are not homogenous or static. Whether nation-
al, regional or transnational, multiple forms of capitals continue to 
perceive Egypt’s geographic location, its topography, demography and 
forms of collective action and organized activism not only as prof-
it-generating resources, but also as tools for negotiation and twisting 
the arms of their adversaries. One glaring example is how the lead-
ers of the Muslim Brotherhood mobilized the grievances of the urban 
poor to mobilize them against the army generals immediately after 
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the uprising. Another example concerns how General Abdel Fattah 
El-Sisi exploited the frustrations of large sectors of liberals to raise 
support for the war on terrorism and pass the anti-protest law in 2014. 
Those discursive factors are difficult to capture theoretically and em-
pirically, and render anthropological analysis difficult. 
Existing theories of social movements and collective action are 
inadequate to account for or explain the prolific dynamics of twen-
ty-first century capitals, collective actions and states. Therefore, this 
study uses theories of social movements and collective action with 
qualifications. Beside the analysis of forms of collective action and 
organized activism, it examines formal policies and subtle signals in 
order to identify the interests of neoliberal capitals within and out-
side sovereign state institutions. Similarly, it analyses the invasive 
discourses and propaganda of fear of terror, chaos and collapse of 
the state, society and the economy, which followed the uprising, and 
lastly, it assesses the dilemmas of modern welfare-warfare statehood 
in Egypt during and after the two democratic Presidential elections in 
2012 and 2014 respectively.
B. SUMMARY OF THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
In order to achieve the objectives above this account will be organized 
in such a way as to answer the following sets of questions:
a)  What was the nature of the states in Egypt under Mubarak? 
What, if any, are the common factors between Mubarak regime 
and its predecessors in how they related to collective action? 
b)  Who are the main collective actors under Mubarak? What were 
their respective patterns of collective action and their ideolo-
gies? When has there been cross-ideological collaborations or 
rivalries and over which demands and agendas? 
c)  What were the factors that led to the eruption of the uprising 
in January 2011 after thirty-one years under Mubarak regime? 
What is the nature of the uprising and was it the sole force be-
hind the deposition of Mubarak? 
d)  How did events unfold after the depositions and what are the 
lessons that activists and state agents have learnt from each 
other and from their own trial and errors?
e)  What are the confrontational events that, when analyzed, 
would help us understand the direction and nature of the trans-
formations in State structures and dynamics and in the modes 
and intensities of collective action? When put together within 
the economic context how would this lead to an understanding 
of the nature and process of statehood in Egypt post uprising?
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f)  Is there a general loss of faith in the state? 
g)  What is the current state of revolution in Egypt and what are 
the possibilities for an emancipatory statehood that delivers 
the demands of the People?
A corollary set of questions concern the theoretical conceptual tools 
that anthropologists use in understanding social construction of state-
hood. Anthropology has often been accused of theoretical and meth-
odological inadequacy in the analysis of states. Validity of such ac-
cusations notwithstanding, the uprising and the events that followed 
lend themselves to the contemporaneity of anthropology’s theories 
and methods. This particular point will be elaborated in the sections 
on the analytical framework as well as following section on data and 
research methods. 
C. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
I. COLLECTIVE ACTION BETWEEN MULTIPLE STATES & MULTIPLE 
CAPITALS
Even as a British colony, the state in Egypt has always sided with cap-
italist forces or sought to act as a capitalist force in its own right as a 
sovereign power. The case of Bank Misr stood out as stark evidence.
Under Gamal Abdel Nasser, the military establishment wrestled 
power from other state institutions and emerged as the defender of 
the state from predatory private capitals and the protector of society 
from religious fundamentalist forces. In its quest for popular and pub-
lic (state sector) legitimacy, the free officers established a patron-client 
structure of relations between the state and the people on one hand 
and in-between state institutions on the other. On one hand, handling 
continuous welfare services to the people. While on the other, securing 
capital-investments in the hands of state-owned and run public utili-
ties. However, with successive military defeats in 1956 and 1967, the 
military establishment was unable to sustain such arrangements and 
a steady stream of disinvestment emerged, leading to the re-consolida-
tion of private capitals in the national economy. 
Meanwhile, collective action was brutally crushed by pervasive 
intelligence policing, which targeted every ideological hue and the 
Muslim Brotherhood – the only organized form of activism – in par-
ticular. Formal democratic institutions (political parties) were forced 
to come under the banner of the Socialist Union - the only formally 
legitimate forum for political activism. Even Al-Azhar and the author-
ity of religious endowments came under the control and payrolls of 
the state. 
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Under Anwar el-Sadat, nuanced state-capitals emerged. One such 
capitals concerned the transformation of state-run utilities into a cat-
egory known as Economic Authorities. This came into being in the 
seventies to give state-owned and run utilities a novel space or ‘Open 
Door’ to profiteer from regional and international liberal markets. Si-
multaneously, Sadat abolished the Socialist Union and cautiously al-
lowed formal political institutions and collective action. He released 
the Muslim Brotherhood hands to counter any potential for a com-
munist revolt. 
Under Hosni Mubarak, and particularly after the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait in 1990-1991, successive rounds of economic reform and 
structural adjustments (ERSAP) had placed the Egyptian political 
economy within the orbit of transnational capitals. ERSAP had also 
consolidated Egypt’s position of multiple dependencies on annual 
grant-in-aid from the United States of America, loans from the World 
Bank under conditions of the International Monetary Fund and grants 
from oil-rich neighboring countries. These adjustments created di-
verse capitals with foothold in the Egyptian political economy. The 
large portion (almost 40%) of such capitals rested with the military 
establishment, either as sole or joint owner of capital and stocks. 
In terms of social movements, the Muslim Brotherhood has mean-
while diversified their operations through two distinctive strategies: a 
militant wing and a preaching or Da’wa wing. The first helped in ter-
rorizing any secular and leftist currents within society, and providing 
logistical support to international fundamentalist movements such as 
the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. Whereas the second wing had 
stealthily, yet steadily Islamized society and state institutions at once. 
Earlier, Sadat’s investment laws of the seventies had allowed 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who had previously fled the 
country under Nasser, to invest in-home and to operate through an 
expansive networks of institutions to provide social services such as 
education, health care and media, i.e. services that the welfare state 
has grown increasingly unable to provide or sustain. At the same time, 
Sadat’s relative easing of state control over formal political activism, 
allowed members of the Muslim Brotherhood to participate and win 
elections of student unions and professional syndicates. It had also 
allowed them to access multiple positions in state ministries and other 
public institutions. 
However, after the militant wing of the Muslim Brotherhood suc-
ceeded to assassin Sadat in 1981, his deputy, Hosni Mubarak, declared 
a state of emergency and started a tight crack down on Islamist mili-
tants. At this historical junction, global market transformation, com-
pounded by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait were followed by successive 
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round of ERSAP, a slew of annual budgetary deficits, and spiraling 
internal governmental debts. All such factors had pushed Mubarak to 
consolidate the security state apparatuses, to decrease financial and 
legal supports to state-run utilities and economic authorities. Expand-
ing security state apparatuses had direct implications on national, re-
gional and transnational capital investments. More importantly, it had 
direct implications on collective action and organized activism and 
social and political movements. 
In brief, those vectors have given Egyptian statehood particular 
features as follows: 
·  Financially and economically weakened state-run utilities vying 
for private acquisitions to meet successive rounds of the eco-
nomic reform and structural adjustment program
·  Strengthened political and economic powers of the military es-
tablishment, which eventually succeeded to acquire or buy-out 
economically unviable state-run utilities
·  A President who drew his legitimacy from military prowess (fac-
tual and imagined) compared to a homogenous state that drew 
legitimacy from welfare services and bestowing social rights to 
citizens
·  A predominantly Islamized society with weak collective action 
and fragmented activism
·  Brutal security apparatuses that violated human rights
·  Ideologically diverse capitalist elites - secular, military and 
religious. 
·  A clique of businesspeople and politicians, which constituted 
a capricious Presidential regime and dominated the Parliament
·  Regional (Gulf) state and private capitalists vying for joint ven-
tures with the ruling elite and the military establishment 
·  Diligent activists with diverse and often, irreconcilable motiva-
tions and resources. 
In summary, the main discourse of the deposed regime vis-à-vis ac-
tivists and citizens in general had consistently been that of fear and 
violence: fear of terror, chaos, collapse, insecurity and disintegration of 
the mythically unified society, economy and the Egyptian state. 
II. REPERTOIRES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Egypt – like several post-colonial nation-states has had myriad forms 
of collective action and multiple trends of social and political activ-
ism, some were short-lived while others were protracted and assumed 
versatile trajectories. One of the powerful examples of protracted and 
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organized collective action in Egypt has emerged within institutions 
of higher education. Universities in general and public ones in partic-
ular have frequently turned out to be vibrant spaces of student activ-
ism, where the interests of the state, multiple capitals and the ‘people’ 
clashed. 
Student movements and activism have repeatedly emerged as 
powerful vectors in social and political transformations since 1919 
(Abdalla, 2008). The transition from private to mass free for all higher 
education in the sixties had itself become an arena of struggle over 
social rights ever since then. Students have repeatedly demonstrated 
to demand fair access to the amenities and the benefits of education 
in terms of degrees, income and employment. 
During the seventies - as the late President Anwar Sadat favored 
Islamists in his war against Nasserists and communists - institutions 
of higher education had, again emerged as fertile grounds for activism 
albeit, what is generally known as political Islam. With several Isla-
mist students and faculty members dominating elected and appointed 
positions in academia. This has helped Islamists interject the state by 
controlling curricula, university governance and elections of student 
unions and professional syndicates. It is even argued that Islamist ac-
tivists “acquired their first political skills during the 1970s while work-
ing with other student activists at Egyptian universities.” (Michaelle 
Browers (2007: 76) as cited in Soudias, 2014:55). 
In the nineties, the tight state of emergency had brought multiple 
strands of activism under ostensibly a single banner. Faculty members 
of public universities and several students spearheaded the Egyptian 
Movement for Change - the first movement to make explicit demands 
for political change in the 1990s. 
Another protracted domain of collective action is labor and work-
ers activism. Although this account does not tackle this long and com-
plex sector, however, it stresses the importance of labor activism in 
shaping Egyptian statehood, particularly under Gamal Abdel Nasser 
and his projects to build a nation-state on the precincts of nationaliza-
tion and on the shoulders of Egyptian workers.
Those examples defy the Orientalists and neo-orientalists’ views 
that Arab and predominantly Muslim communities are either, docile 
and obsequious to elders and rulers, or endemically mired in a culture 
of tribal rivalry, violence, rioting and vandalism. The present account 
offers a different perspective. One that highlights collective action and 
political activism and tracks how they intersect and engage with for-
mal state institutions. 
One of the most organized forms of protracted activism is the 
Muslim Brotherhood. The movement has its origins in the Islamic 
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reform movements of 1875 – 1940s (Gasper, 2009). Since its inception 
in 1928, and unlike other activists and social movements, the Broth-
erhood has persistently redefined its strategies to coalesce, confront 
or ally with their opponents. They have repeatedly shifted their de-
mands and objectives in response to capitalist imperatives and re-
gional forces. Sometimes they succeeded to establish sympathetic or 
loyal constituencies among diverse sections of the population through 
long-term strategies within existing social institutions. At other times, 
they followed short-term tactics within formal political structures and 
succeeded to penetrate state structures and institutions. Through per-
sistent struggles to ‘Islamize’ society and to infiltrate state institutions 
since the 1920s, the collectivity of ‘political Islam’ has managed to 
Islamize polity and redefine the meanings and shape of the struggles 
for bread, freedom, social justice and human dignity that eventually 
erupted in January 2011. 
Other movements, contemporary to the Muslim Brotherhood 
have also carved their distinctive paths towards modern political sub-
jectivities. Those include the communists, the leftist, the nationalists, 
in addition to the Nasserists. Nonetheless, since the later years of the 
nineties, other movements emerged. Those were mostly extra-par-
liamentary coalitions between individuals, established movements, 
non-governmental organizations and political parties. The Egyptian 
movement for change (Kefaya) is an example as well as the March 9 
movement for Academic Freedoms, the Egyptian Anti-Globalization 
Group and the March 20 movement are examples of such strands of 
organized activism (Abdelrahman, 2009). 
Still other movements operated outside those classical categories, 
such as the massive welfare associations working through churches 
and mosques and the celebrity-preachers’ circles of religious educa-
tion such as Amr Khaled and Khalid al-Jindi as well as few other fe-
male preachers since the early 2000s. 
Across the spectrum of political ideologies, most of pre-uprising 
activism has been in response to successive economic reforms and 
structural adjustments. The diverse and multiple forms of activism 
have consistently been in dialectical relationships with the impera-
tives and dynamics of diverse and multiple forms of capital. 
The shift to an explicit demand for political change was stealthy 
and broke out when the National Democratic Party and the Presiden-
cy took unequivocal measures to prepare Gamal Mubarak, son of Hos-
ni Mubarak for presidency. Those measures brought diverse and of-
ten antagonistic activists and social movements together. Since 2000, 
multiple voices collectively demanded regime change alongside the 
repeated demands for economic and social rights. 
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On 25 January 2011, Egyptians took to the streets demanding the 
deposition of the ruling regime and the ousting of the former presi-
dent Hosni Mubarak. Having raised the national flag and chanted slo-
gans of nationalist hues, several commentators argued that the upris-
ing was non-religious i.e. it was not inspired or instigated by Islamists. 
During the days of the uprising, protesters represented various ideo-
logical hues and many could not even be aligned with any particular 
political or ideological current. On the streets, religious and secular 
groups and individuals had joined forces under the common banner 
of “bread, freedom, social justice and human dignity.” 
III. THE RESILIENT REGIME AND ITS DIVISIVE DISCOURSES 
The events that transpired during the eighteen-day uprising, with re-
gards to the solidarities among protestors and the brutalities of the 
security forces and police-hired thugs towards protestors could, at 
best, serve as chronological fodder for an anthropological account. 
Although listed in due course in this paper, they would not make a 
critical sense except when placed retrospectively into the contexts of 
structural and relational factors. That is to say, after the white heat 
of the uprising had subsided. Some of those forces predated the up-
rising, with their logical origins in the protracted state of emergency 
- declared upon the assassination of Anwar Sadat and the ascendance 
of Mubarak to power in 1981. Whereas, other factors arose in the af-
termath of the uprising. Both sets of factors reveal the extent of the 
regime’s resilience and the structural predicaments of the Egyptian 
statehood. 
The first factor concerned the divisive discourses of state-run 
media and state-loyal scholars regarding the uprising and activism 
that predated it. One discourse from state-owned Al-Ahram Centre 
for Political and Strategic Studies claimed that activists were divid-
ed into two categories namely, movements that seek political change 
and movements that make specific social and economic demands. The 
latter were labeled “matlabiya,” to refer to the demands (mataleb) of 
one or more sectors of the population. This study argues that this divi-
sion is arbitrary and has no theoretical or historical basis. Firstly, this 
distinction denies the fact that under the repressive regime, the very 
act of protesting was itself a manifestation of the demand for politi-
cal participation. The same divisive discourse has repeatedly used in 
state-run media after the uprising in order to demonize protests and 
portray protestos as opportunists who sought personal gains at a time 
when the country has passed through taxing times.
Secondly, empirical evidence supported the argument that the 
distinction between the political and the matlabiya collective actions 
20
ThE ARMy, ThE MuSlIM BRoThERhooD & ThE REST In EgyPT PoST 2011
and movements was regime propaganda. As early as the nineteen 
nineties, there has been a vocal resurgence of labor activism partic-
ularly in the industrial manufaturing sectors. Around the same time, 
a cross-ideological and cross-class mode of student activism has also 
emerged. By the late nineteen nineties, both labor and student ac-
tivism were joined by other sectors of the population namely, slum 
dwellers, employers and employees of small and medium enterprises 
and the self-employed. 
Collective action among employees of the public services sector 
constituted 12.4% of the total number of recorded cases of protest 
in the nineteen nineties. Ironically, those were the very sections of 
employees whom the deposed regime used to mobilize in support of 
its policies. In addition, 80.9% of recorded protests happened outside 
and independent of the traditional frames of political participation i.e. 
outside political parties and NGOs, with their distinctinctive ideolog-
ical hues. In addition, most protests were predominantly carried out 
by persons who were not experienced activists. Lastly, the demands 
raised at the majority of protests were not limited to protestors’ re-
spective occupational or class related consumption, instead, they rep-
resented multiple inspirations and desires for political and intellectual 
freedoms, anti-repression, anti-corruption, and anti-profiteering. 
 The divisive discourses of the regime supporters in media and re-
search centres seemed to capitalize, instead, on the discrepancies be-
tween the protestors’ declared demands and the principles that guided 
their collective actions and movements. Those discrepancies do not 
necessarily mean contradictions between demands and principles. 
They rather constitute an important analytical premise that is often 
overlooked by many analysts of revolutions and social movements, 
yet one that is oganic to the present study in its attempt to argue that 
activism in Egypt is experiencing a state of permanent revolution. 
Some radical scholars did record such distinction/discrepancy 
between declared demands and underpinning principles. Abdelrah-
man (2009) recorded it while studying the rapproachment between 
leftists and Islamists after the second Palestinian Intifada in 2000. 
She observed how pre-uprising activism was cross-ideological and 
fluid. While maintaining their individual and institutional differences 
of principles, in their alliances, “none of [the movements acted as] a 
single, homogenous, united front representing a monolithic political 
camp... [Rather, many, if not all, were characteristed by] internal con-
flicts and subgroups and divisions” (ibid., p. 38). 
She demonstrated how diverse movements, even arch-enemies 
displayed remarkable fluidity in alliances, raised various related de-
mands and rallied around multiple issues. One of the starck examples 
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was the Egyptian Popular Committee in Solidarity with the Intifada 
(uprising). This was a national initiative that began as a campaign 
to donate blood and money to Palestinians in their uprising against 
the Israeli violations of human rights. The movement developed into 
a rally demanding explicit political reform of the Mubarak regime. 
Out of this committee came the annual “Cairo Conference” where 
non-partisan opposition forces came together under anti-war (US-UK 
invasion of Iraq in 2003), anti-neoliberalisation (IMF and World Bank 
structural adjustments of the Egyptian economy) and a bit later an-
ti-inheritance of presidency (against Mubarak renewal of term and his 
son’s succession) banners (Browers, 2007). 
Besides – an in spite of - fluidity, most social movements were 
internally dynamic and sometimes discordant. Whether parties or 
movements, leftists, for instane, have often had endemic divisions 
over ideological principles, orientations and programs, and strate-
gies and tactics. Before the uprising, this camp included the Tagam-
mu party, the banned communist party, the Revolutionary Socialists 
movement, the People group, and the Democratic Left group (Abdel-
rahman, 2009).
Long before the uprising in 1976, the Tagammu had already mor-
phed into the National Progressive Unionist Party (NPUP) to include 
socialists, communists, Arab nationalists and Nasserists. Compared to 
others in this camp, the Tagammu party was able to sustain favorable 
relations with the Political Parties Committee appointed to oversee 
political parties in Egypt under Mubarak (Stacher, 2004). After the up-
rising, Refaat Al-Saeed, president of the party had not supported the 
popular movement, compelling 73 of the party’s committee members 
to resign in March 2011(Choucri, 2011). 
Islamist activism is no less fluid and in fact presents us with a case 
that would expand theoretical renditions borrowed from advanced 
democratic contexts. Within the expansive literature on this large cat-
egory of activism, sometimes called political Islam, Islamic activism is 
conceived of as urban protest movements that accommodated yet re-
sisted established worldviews and oppressive regimes (Macleod, 1991; 
Al-Sayyid Marsot, 1984), as social services organizations by and for the 
middle classes (Bayat, 1998), as a means of suppressing and mediating 
social conflicts and a means for capital accumulation (Beinin, 2005).
In addition to the potential discord between demands and princi-
ples, the regime’s divisive discourse also capitalized on the fragility of 
the alliances between diverse activists and movements. As mentioned 
above, cross-ideological alliances had already been effective among 
university students particularly while organizing for independent 
student unions and mobilizing against state security intervention in 
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campus and university affairs since year 2000. They were created to 
capture opportunities or face threats made by the state and its mul-
tiple sovereign agencies (See Shehata & Stacher, 2007 for analysis of 
Al-Azhar Militia event). However, once the physical threat of state re-
pression subsided, most alliance dissipated, thus strengthening the 
‘old’ regime’s divisive discourses. 
Although alliances consumed substantial energies and time, 
cross-ideological forums became learning mechanisms that generated 
networking and experiential repretoires. Mobilizing for alliances was 
generally premised upon the shared belief that movements were sub-
ject to similar threats and that cooperation in a plural milieu was more 
productive than waring as rivals, under the umberella of opposition. 
This plurality created “imagined solidarity” (Bayat, 2005) whereby 
individuals and groups internalized such “generalized believes” and 
“shared values” around which their “collective mind” worked (Tarrow, 
1988). This imagined solidarity contributed to the appearance of pro-
testors as a popular front movement and gave impetus to “We the 
People demand the fall of the regime” (“Al-Shaab Yorid Isqat al Ni-
zam”). It was this “cognitive liberation” (Tarrow, 1988) that sustained 
the uprising and bestowed upon the days that immediately followed it 
the appearance of anarachy and arbitrary self-rule.
IV. WARRING DEMOCRACIES: MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AGAINST 
STATE SOVEREIGNTY
The speed and discursiveness of events that followed the deposition of 
Mubarak rendered the nature of the emerging statehood elusive, and 
made the transition period appear as moving target for any reliable 
critical analysis. Two instances stood out as particularly critical. The 
first concerned the behavior of the military during the eighteen day 
uprising, and the second concerned the behavior of Mubarak’s Min-
ister of Defense, General Abdel Hameed Tantawi, who directed the 
Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) towards the leaders of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in 2011.
·  Throughout Tahrir Square sit-in, the military stood in support of 
the people. They exercised self-restraint from violently crushing 
the uprising. They did not support the President, who was simul-
taneously the Supreme Head of Armed Forces according to the 
Egyptian Constitution. 
·  Mona El-Ghobashy (2012) argued that SCAF and the leaders of 
the Muslim Brotherhood exchanged the post-uprising Presiden-
cy for safe exit of the army generals who supported Mubarak and 
were implicated in corrupt frauds. The deal culminated in the 
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election of the Brotherhood’s candidate, Mohammed Morsi, who 
in turn absolved General Tantawi from his duties without trails.
After the deposition of the regime and its parliament, there was polit-
ical vacuum. Nonetheless, several sovereign state agencies remained 
almost intact. The Supreme Constitutional Court, the Highest Admin-
istrative Court, and the General Prosecutor were cases in point. Other 
agencies boosted their powers such as the military, whereas others re-
shuffled but retained massive sway over public opinion such as state-
run media. 
Since Nasser’s time and unlike Weberian conceptions of rational, 
neutral bureaucracies, those agencies have rarely, if ever, been out-
side the purview of the “political.” Once in power in 2013, the Muslim 
Brotherhood had staged a sit-in that locked-in and locked-out simul-
taneously, several members of the Supreme Constitutional Court at 
the headquarters of the court in the eastern part of Cairo. They staged 
another lock-in of several media persons in Media City, in the Sixth of 
October governorate south-west of Cairo for several days. Those two 
sit-ins were sufficient evidence of belligerence between the democrat-
ically elected President and democratic institutions of the state, i.e. 
warring democracies that engaged in a brute dialectics of violence. 
V. DIALECTICS OF FEAR AND VIOLENCE: STRUCTURAL 
PREDICAMENTS OF STATEHOOD
The belligerence between the Muslim Brotherhood and sovereign 
state agencies was not the only dialectic of violence. Immediately af-
ter Mubarak stepped down, jubilant, enthusiastic and self-confident 
activists had organized around rebuilding state structures. Ground 
activities had re-energized and expanded geographically into rural ar-
eas. Several coalitions and alliances had forged particularly between 
members of diverse youth groups, collectively labelled the “revolu-
tionary youth” camp. Immediately after the deposition of Mubarak, a 
joint statement by thirteen Egyptian NGOs submitted a draft plan of 
transition to SCAF. The plan delineated a blueprint for the gradual ac-
tivation of economic, social and cultural rights that meet the demands 
of the uprising. 
SCAF had systematically ignored the pan. In response, several 
activists demonstrated regularly in Tahrir Square and mounted make-
shift stages from which representatives and spokespersons addressed 
the public, presented programs or listed names of trusted figures while 
audiences walked around listening and debating. One of the dear de-
mands that went unheeded concerned the formation of a national 
committee of civilian and military figures to draft a new constitution 
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based on transparent criteria of selection of participants. Instead, or 
in deliberate neglect, SCAF announced a referendum on the old and 
defunct 1971 constitution and in March 2011, people took to poll sta-
tions against many activists and intellectuals’ intuitions.
In the immediate aftermath of the referendum, many spots across 
the country witnessed violent clashes between Coptic-Christians and 
Muslims- the two main religious ethnicities. SCAF and state-run me-
dia took advantage and portrayed the clashes live examples of how 
things could turn out if Egypt emerges into an Islamist state with reli-
gion as basis of full citizenship. 
Conversely, rumors spread anxieties over the alleged immoralities 
– like the legitimization of alternate sexualities - associated with the 
secular state that separates religion from politics. This period - be-
tween the referendum and Parliamentary elections in 2011- witnessed 
the resurgence of violence reminiscent of the deposed regime perpe-
trated against activists by military police, the state security forces, re-
named national security forces, and hired thugs in civilian attire. 
Activists responded by escalating protests and diversifying activi-
ties as well as establishing several vigilance groups to follow up events 
and campaign against the rule of the military raising the slogan “Down 
with the Rule of The Junta” “Yasqot yasqot hokm al askar.” Kazeboon 
(liars) was a particularly vocal campaign organized by media special-
ists and university professors who relied heavily on short videos, rap-
pers and visualizations of street fights to scandalize brutalities. 
Sovereign state agencies such as the Supreme Constitutional 
Court (SCC) and the Supreme Administrative Court came forcefully 
into the dialectic of fear and violence. In June 2012, SCC ruled out the 
law that the Parliamentary had passed earlier in April 2012, barring 
members of the deposed regime from high politics. The court had later 
dissolved the Parliament and transferred legislative powers to SCAF.
Meanwhile, SCAF issued a unilateral constitutional declaration 
that disallowed the President from declaring war without SCAF’s ap-
proval. The army could then intervene to quell any domestic instabil-
ity and the council assumed the powers to form its own constituent 
assembly in the event of obstacles emerging in the draft of a new con-
stitution. In addition, the generals acquired the power of veto over the 
existing assembly. 
This particular paradox must be seen in light of the structure of 
the Egyptian bureaucracy and of sovereign state agencies. Historians 
of the Egyptian bureaucracy and technocracy vouch that few agencies 
operated with the objective of servicing citizens. Instead, many were 
machines and mechanisms of capital, status and power accumulation 
(Mitchell, 2002; Waterbury, 1993). This has shaped the manners each 
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agency aligned in differential patron-client compacts with the deposed 
regime and especially with the apex institution of the presidency. 
The deposed president, his diwan and small coterie of business-
persons selectively favored and disfavored one or the other sovereign 
agencies and certain factions within each. This partly explained why 
none of these agencies was monolithically unified. It was a presiden-
tial discretion to appoint incumbents or to indirectly establish and 
mobilize mechanisms within sovereign agencies such as the Commit-
tee of Political Parties to achieve specific goals or many times to de-
ploy outright intimidation through security services (Brown, 2012). 
With the absence of the presidency with its omnipresent discretionary 
powers, many agencies are currently engaged in battles for survival 
and consolidation of gains.
Beside established social movements and popular commit-
tees, there are thousands of interest groups who emerged to mobi-
lize around specific consumption issues such as “We want to live”, 
“We will not pay,” and “Clean Land” (Gamal, 2012). The first two are 
groups of slum dwellers organized around protesting the failures of 
the government to provide them with basic necessities, while the third 
is a protest initiative sponsored by the The Muslim Brotherhood as an 
alternative solution to the same failures. “Youths Who Love Egypt” 
is another intiative that resembles “Clean Land” yet is organized by 
students of Al-Azhar university. I observed a fine yet important distinc-
tion between these initiatives: spontneous initiatives whose members 
act independent of any sponsor usually resort to street tactics such 
as sit-ins and strikes or tactics of last resort such as hunger strikes 
compared to sponsored initiatives who predominatly operate virtually 
through online campaigning. 
While on one side protests are more organized and strikes could 
now last longer than before the uprising and are nationally coordinat-
ed as compared to site- or workplace-specific, such accusations usu-
ally polarize public opinion into sympathizers and adversaries and 
divert the energies of protestors as they are pushed to explain their 
actions. For instance, in its coverage of the national strikes of public 
university staff, public transport workers and medical staff of public 
health institutions in September 2012, ON TV, a private satellite chan-
nel, interviewed Mustafa Al-Beheiry, the intern at Aga Public Health 
Unit, who had just completed five days on hunger strike. In response 
to accusations read by the host, Al-Beheiry explained the misery of 
medical staff and listed their demands which included clear budgetary 
suggestions to improve and increase public relays to the Ministry of 
Health, the restructuring of the latter and stressed that improved and 
regular salaries were the last on the list. 
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Thrusting a discourse of binaries on acitvism is nothing new. It is 
not even sheer state propaganda. It is part of the dialectic of violence 
that underlies state-society dynamics and is integral to the idea of the 
modern state. The social compact between citizens and the modern 
state regarding equality, freedom and justice is built upon the belief 
that citizens are predatory by nature and that the state is the neu-
tral arbiter to set and settle boundaries (Lummis, 2010). Part of the 
functions of the state is to divide in order to rule. This is the gist of 
modern law through which the state can classify subjects into dan-
gerous criminals, traitors, offenders, dissenters, radicals and mod-
erates (Asad, 2012; Nandy, 2010). It is not drastically opposed to the 
basic premise of the umma in Islamic jurisprudence in its submis-
sion to divine sovereignty through the righteousness of its “wise men” 
who constitute the council of shura or consultative body (Rutherford, 
2006). 
Binaries of sinners and gooddoers, of the faithful and the apos-
tates are few representations of the language of power spoken by hi-
erarcial institutions where truth/power resides unequivocally with 
those on the top. This is the language spoken by all sovereign state 
agencies Egypt has known since 1952 and by most if not all faith-
based social movements like the The Muslim Brotherhood, the Ansa-
rul-Sunna organization and Al-Da‘wa Al-Salafiya in Alexandria. It is 
the language used by the deposed regime as it contrasted itself with 
“Islamic fundamentalists” and begged international acceptance as the 
secular protector of the region from the horrors that they could leach. 
This binary was uncritically picked up by Islamists who “In contrast, 
for many of those sympathetic to Islamist social and political cur-
rents, the most pressing danger to Egyptian society came in the form 
of rampant secularization, the erosion of the society’s Islamic char-
acter under the impact of Western cultural forms. This oppositional 
logic—either secular or religious—had long schematized the political 
terrain in Egypt” (Hirschkind, 2012, p. 2). 
Classification and forcing invididuals and groups into tight cate-
gories is a form of violence that characterised the campaigns before 
the referendum and parliamentary elections, then informed public 
discusions of Wathiqat Al-Azhar (Al-Azhar Document) on the princi-
ples of a civil state in June 2011 and later Ali Al-Salmi’s document on 
basic constitutional principles in September 2011. The current dis-
cussion of the role of Shar‘ia versus secular criminal and personal 
status laws in the draft of the new constitution is cast along binaries 
of “seculars” versus “fundamentalists;” defenders of the modern na-
tion state versus defenders of Islamist ideas of a state compliant with 
Divine will.
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This violence of binary oppositions color the discourses of for-
mal democratic institutions. The political parties formed after the up-
rising need to grabble with politics of exclusion and inclusion based 
upon identities. The state of uncertainty that surrounds the status of 
Coptic citizens, has been created and reproduced over time by sover-
eign state agencies. The military’s brutal killing of Coptic protestors 
in Maspero demonstrations in October 2011 was no anomaly. The 
difference between this incidence and earlier cases of ethnic violence 
under the deposed regime such as the explosion outside Al Qiddis-
seen Church in Alexandria on new year’s eve of 2011, is that this time 
the culpability of the state is undisguised. The removal of a regime 
that posed as the defender of “religious peace” (Asad, 2012), does not 
mean that the strategies of divide and rule is gone.
VI. EL-SISI COUP D’ETAT BETWEEN MULTIPLE CAPITALS AND 
MULTIPLE STATES
However, since the Open Door policies (Infitah) in the seventies, 
Egyptian statehood has been continuously constructed around dia-
lectics of fear and violence between a president drawing his legitimacy 
from military prowess (factual and imagined), brutal security appara-
tuses, multiple and overlapping sovereign state institutions, regimes 
of elite neoliberals, and diligent activists with diverse often irreconcil-
able motivations and resources. 
This study traces how the dialectics of fear and violence have left 
an indelible mark on the modes of post-uprising activism and on their 
potential for establishing a state that delivers the demands of “the 
People.” This potential is not exclusively a function of the resources 
mustered by activists; it is also circumscribed by basic dilemmas in 
the idea of a modern state and by the contradictions between the exi-
gencies of democracy and national identity, especially when the latter 
is predominantly defined along religious lines. 
It is repeatedly argued that militant Islamism has lost its sway in 
Egypt and elsewhere and that we might be living in a post-Islamist 
era (Bayat, 2007; Stacher J. A., 2002). Designations of this sort seem 
a luxury in the current situation where violence and brutalities have 
intensified since the uprising and where protests still revolve around 
basic necessities of “consumption,” women’s and minority rights, and 
competing value and belief systems. 
Two main vectors seemed to intensify the violence through which 
these constituencies related to each other. The first was successive 
economic restructuring and structural adjustments of the economy 
and the second was the oppressive regional contexts (Israeli and 
American occupations and “Gulf Oil”) that legitimated diverse forms 
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of Islamic activism – at times militant that is capable of inflicting 
damage on apex institution (late president Sadat’s assassination) and 
on economic infrastructure.
Social movements are, basically, collective actions that aspire to 
effect change in society and polity through sustained engagements. 
This study shows how successive protest cycles and confrontations 
since the nineties have taught activists and state agents novel tactics 
and strategies. Over time, those cycles have eventually resulted in 
deep structural transformations and reconfigurations of what consti-
tutes the Egyptian statehood. 
Working with social movement theories and political opportunity 
structures (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2007), this study shows how par-
ticular modes of political activism, made possible under the deposed 
Mubarak regime have – for good or bad - put in place specific struc-
tures of opportunities and constraints that shaped subsequent forms 
of activism and statehood. 
In conclusion, post-uprising activism has evolved within a polit-
ical system that is simultaneously “open” compared to pre-uprising 
eras and characterized by conspicuous antagonism between members 
of the elite (The Muslim Brotherhood, SCAF and “dregs”) – at least 
during the transition to a civilian government. Nevertheless, once in 
charge SCAF and later the The Muslim Brotherhood resorted to the 
same old school of repression through direct violence and social con-
trol of protest by deploying plainclothes security personnel to beat 
and dispense crowds and by public demonization of protest through 
restrict legislation and the media. Theories of resource mobilization 
and relative deprivation argued that such measures will eventually 
increase frustration and push activism to radicalize (cf Beinin and 
Vairel (2011) and Bayat (2005) criticism of “relative deprivation “ the-
ory. ; the degree of repression and radicalization are gauged only by 
the perceived threat and opportunities on the part of both the state 
and activists. The question then becomes: are we expecting another 
uprising similar in magnitude or stealth fundamental change or a re-
turn to normalization of oppression?
There is no definite answer to this question but we can begin to 
figure out the possibility of each scenario by looking at the contradic-
tions of the modern (civic) nation state, the violence upon which it 
sustains itself whether in its technocratic structure, law, science, and 
discourses of economic growth and development and by looking at 
who are actually involved in shaping statehood or possess at least a 
rudimentary vision of statehood in Egypt now? 
We can begin at the idea of modern nation-state. It is con-
structed by maintaining tight association between an institutional 
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technocratic structure (the state), “organized nationalism, mega-sci-
ence and the growth of an urban-industrial society” (Nandy, 2010). 
This association is possible only by differentiation i.e. the inclusion 
of some classes, sexes, and ethnicities and the exclusion and/or mar-
ginalization of others. This covers the marginalization of other forms 
of non-western, pre-colonial organizational and associational forms 
or freezing them into ideal types such as “oriental despotism,” “trib-
alism,” “Islamist Umma.” 
Like most of its post-colonial counterparts, Egypt has known the 
nation-state as the clue to the West’s economic and scientific power 
and the idea of a native nation-state was seen as the panacea of all 
ills. After the military coup of 1952, Nasser forced the structure of a 
secular and technocratic state upon a sprouting yet ambiguous Islam-
ic idea of a nation. The latter was wrought by Islamic reformers and 
“modernizers” of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (Gas-
per 2009) and the The Muslim Brotherhood beginning in 1928. There is 
no doubt that neither group had formulated a tangible program for an 
Islamic alternative compared to - and partly because of his repression 
- Nasser who managed to give shape to a “native” form of a modern 
state albeit contradictory and dysfunctional (particularly after the de-
feat against the Israeli-British forces in 1967).
With regards to activism, Nasser’s charisma and nationalist dis-
position, helped nurture “indigenous” versions of socialism and an 
avant guard – mostly from the middle classes who were supposedly 
well versed in the discourses of the modern nation state and capable 
of instilling their political sensibility upon the rest. Contrary to Marx 
version of historical development, the vanguards failed to “wither 
away” the state to which they owe their existence and instead spent 
most of their active lives in its jails. They failed to mold a state of free-
dom, equality, justice and dignity however defined. 
Members of the leftist intelligentsia were given one blow after an-
other. From the failure of the Nasserist project to the open door (Infit-
ah) policy of his successor Anwar Sadat. Sadat leached the Islamists to 
fight the Nasserists. More damaging, he supported their ascension to 
the apex of the economy. “A substantial faction of the Infitah class had 
an Islamist cast. By 1980 elders of 8 of the 18 families who dominated 
Egypt’s private sector were affiliated with the The Muslim Brotherhood. 
Economic enterprises linked to the society, many concentrated in real 
estate and currency speculation, Islamic banking channeling workers’ 
remittances may have constituted as much as 40 percent of the private 
sector” (Beinin, 2005, p. 120). Three of the general guides, murshid of 
the organization came from wealthy families namely, Hasan Al-Hu-
daiby, Umar Al-Tilmisany and Mustafa Mashhour (Ibid.). 
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The story of his assassination on the hands of the Islamists has 
been well documented (Bayat, 2007) but upon his death, the Egyp-
tian nation state had to contend with a militant political Islam and a 
weakened leftism. The activism of the vanguards of Nasser days had 
hibernated only to “atomize” under Mubarak. Under the latter, the 
Egyptian state had no space for leftist intellectuals especially in light 
of the disintegration of leftist formal organizations and repression by 
the deposed regime. The remaining leftist political party was “vam-
pired” by internal strife and the hegemony of the Political Party Com-
mittee (Stacher J. A., 2004). The leftists’ desire to maintain a feeling of 
independence has driven them to the line of least resistance by writing 
opinion columns in state-run press or holding discussions in private 
locations and writing fiction (Duboc, 2011). 
The deposed state also had no place for militant Islamists, who 
after succeeding to deter what they called “secular” forces through 
a series of assassinations and attacks across the country had been 
clamped down by the pervasive security apparatuses and prolong the 
rule of emergency (Bayat, 2007). Incidentally, many of those militants 
were pardoned and released from prisons after the election of Mo-
hammed Morsi as President in 2012. They have now formed formal 
political wings such as the Jama’a Islamiya. By early 2000s the Egyp-
tian state has been successfully Islamized. Religion has become inte-
gral to the “indigenous” nation-state and to formal politics. 
Besides Al-Azhar, Ministry of Endowments and other religious 
sovereign state agencies, religions is shaping the “indigenous” nation 
state like never before. Whether through the Renaissance Project of 
the Muslim Brotherhood or through contestations of Sharia in the 
constitutional committee by members of the Salafi front, the Islamist 
has recently emerged as the only fragment of vision of a nation state 
and as the contestant against equally loose visions of the Nasserist, 
leftist, and socialists (the popular front) or the non-Islamist liberals 
who believe in capital (the bloc). The latter forces and trends are now 
forming the coalitions and fronts that I discussed above even though 
they are not internally coherent. 
What plagues the left plagues the rest and lies in the contradictions 
of what everybody seeks from the modern nation state. The Movement 
for Academic Independence is a glaring example (will elaborate later). 
The Islamists are pushing for a nation state that aligns with what they 
perceive as the essence of the Islamic way of life and the “authentic 
soul of the Egyptian family” as stated in the draft constitution released 
in October 2012, while the liberals seek a state that best reflects the 
middle class aspirations of “life style” modeled around western no-
tions of freedom and human rights. The leftists in their zeal to connect 
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to the larger masses try to argue for a state that delivers basic necessi-
ties for human survival. 
 While fragments of diverse incomplete visions of the modern 
nation state manifest in ideological debates in the media, the par-
liament and headquarters of new-founded political parties, workers, 
peasants, the unemployed and the under employed are fighting their 
own battle on the streets through vibrant, protracted and nationally 
well organized strikes and sit-ins. They zealously establish and run 
independent syndicates, unions and federations to have direct “voice” 
oblivious of the law that attempts to ban it (labor law of 2003). It is a 
fundamental change that has already succeeded through the uprising 
to prize open the institution of the presidency, nothing less. Their vi-
sion of the Egyptian statehood seems to be drawn in direct contrast 
to the “specialized coercive apparatus [and] private business venture” 
(Nandy, 2010, p. 295) that was the state under the previous regimes. It 
is also and at once a class struggle. The radicalization of the demands 
and of protests posed existential questions to all activists on the ideo-
logical battle field. 
Going back to the question of possible scenarios, it is clear that the 
answer lies in the extent of the marginalized to continue the struggle 
against the nation state and harness their experiential repertoires of 
recent mobilizations, muster the organic leadership and the “density 
of the social networks that have been mobilized” in order to “generate 
sufficient mutual trust to overcome decades of fear instilled by author-
itarian regimes (Beinin and Vairel, 2011, Kindle Edition). Nandy has 
previously underscored how the paradox of the nation state “has en-
sured that organized political power cannot easily be mobilized, even 
in the Southern world, to resist the pathologies of the modern state. 
Either the resistance has to come from the fringes of the polity or it 
has to legitimize itself in the language of the mainstream. The vested 
interests which have grown up around the idea of the modern state 
define, thus, not merely the mainstream but also most of the popular 
concepts of dissent. Ashish Nandy (2010) 
It is also their capacity to sustain their presence on the streets and 
in forums while constantly aware of free riders. Writing from an activ-
ist perspective, Anne Alexander exhorts the left to grasp the political 
and organizational opportunities opened up by the exposure of the 
Islamists that has resulted from establishing a formal political system, 
“It is worth reflecting on how a lack of understanding of the nature 
of mass Islamist organizations, and the social contradictions within 
them, could have sent left wing activists [….] into the trap of pursuing 
an abstract political battle with the Brotherhood framed around the 
question of “Islamism” versus “secularism” instead of developing a 
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strategy of using the social struggle in order to deepen the Brother-
hood’s internal political crisis, and thus give the left time to build and 
organize. (Alexander, International Socialism, 2012). It is through the 
struggles of the people and continuous interactions that people will 
begin to realize that the “ideological pronouncements can be analyzed 
as effects and not predictors of [leaders’] political experiences” (El-
Gobashy, 2005, p. 375). 
There is definitely the threat of social fatigue and demobilization. 
Charles Tilly’s (1978) idea that people mobilize more easily and quick-
ly if they perceive a threat as opposed to opportunities is definitely 
valid but it fails to account for the situation of despair and the state 
where people have nothing else to lose. When demonstrators in Tahrir 
Square improvised the song that went “viral” on the internet chanting, 
“our rights are paramount and hunger does not bother us anymore,” 
they were setting the threshold of their struggles. The possibility of a 
civic state that delivers their demands seems to reside in the politics 
of their presence even when as in the words of Anne Bogart, “the spirit 
of liberty is the spirit that is not too certain it is right” (Bogart, 2007, 
Kindle Edition).
Nonetheless, the following table – compiled from statistical fig-
ures documented chronologically by The Egyptian Center for Eco-
nomic and Social Rights and uploaded on the center’s website 
Wikithawra (Rights, n.d.) indicates how state brutalities have in-
creased under the democratically elected President Al-Sisi.
Meanwhile, as of May 2014, Egypt’s fiscal deficit reached LE189.4 
billion, or 9.3 percent of Gross Domestic Product. At the same time 
last year, the deficit recorded LE204.9 billion, or 11.7 percent of GDP. 
Government expenditures hit LE519.7 billion between July 2013 and 
May 2014, up by 9.6 percent from LE 474.3 billion in the same pe-
riod a year earlier. This increase was largely driven by increases in 
Tahrir Uprising SCAF MB – Morsi 
Rule
El-Sisi
Deaths Civilian 1022 406 399 2927
Police 49 24 52 226
Military 4 8 19 95
Total 1075 438 470 3248
Injured 16806 9228 18535
In Custody 4809 41163
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employee wages and compensation, with rose by LE28.9 billion to 
reach LE151.9 billion, and rising interest payments, which reached 
LE139 billion, an increase of LE14.3 billion compared to the previous 
year. This increase came despite decreases in spending on subsidies, 
grants and social benefits, which stood at LE140.7 billion, down by 
LE9.4 billion. On the revenue side, the Ministry recorded LE337.8 bil-
lion, compared to LE271.3 billion the previous year. This figure in-
cludes LE51.5 billion in grants, including LE21 in cash from the Arab 
Gulf, as well as an allocation of LE29.7 billion worth of dollar de-
nominated deposits from the Central Bank. Taxes on domestic salaries 
amounted to LE17.5 billion, while taxes on industrial and commercial 
profits amounted to LE30.6 billion, including settlements made in De-
cember 2013 and January 2014. Property taxes, largely on Treasury 
bills and bonds reached LE14.2 billion. Meanwhile, total government 
debt, both foreign and external, rose to LE1.9 trillion, or 93.9 percent 
of GDP, by the end of June 2014. The previous June, that figure stood 
at LE1.6 billion, or 93.8 percent of GDP1.
1 http://www.madamasr.com/content/despite-slow-growth-finance-ministry-sounds-
optimistic-note Accessed on September 4, 2014
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PRELUDE
On 25 January 2011, Egyptians took to the streets demanding the 
deposition of the ruling regime and the ousting of the former pres-
ident Hosni Mubarak, who presided over the country for thirty-one 
years and who have declared a protracted state of emergency upon 
his ascension to power in 1981. Protestors raised the national flag and 
chanted slogans of nationalist hues. They had even raised the flag of 
the crescent and the cross – an emblem of the unity between Muslims 
and Coptic Christians of Egypt carried earlier during the 1919 revo-
lution. Observing this, many western media analysts thought that the 
uprising was an instance of anti-regime mass demonstrations without 
any religious, class or ethnic undertones. During the days of the up-
rising, protesters had indeed come from variable ideological locations 
and in the midst of the sit-in one could not easily distinguish between 
a liberal, secular or a Salafi1. Political, social, and ideological currents 
mingled in Tahrir. On the streets, religious and secular groups and 
individuals had joined forces under the common banner demanding 
“bread, freedom, social justice and human dignity,” (Aish, Horriyya, 
Adala Ijtimaiyya, Karama Insaniyya)! 
1 Scripturalists who advocate a literal interpretation of Islamic religious texts, mainly 
the Holy Quran and the Prophets’ Sayings.
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The success of the popular uprising to depose the regime on Feb-
ruary 11, 2011 however, left Egypt in a state of uncertainty, exposed 
to various and competing economic, political and ideological vectors. 
Some of the latter were underway much before the uprising, where-
as others emerged during and after the mass sit-in, in response to 
re-alignments of states, elites and capital on the national, the regional 
and international scales. For months after the uprising, exhilarated 
activists and demonstrators worked around the clock, not only to lit-
erally, clean Tahrir, but also to continue vibrant social and political 
dialogues over the future of society, economy, polity and the state. Un-
derstanding the complexity of this period and the sheer momentum 
of such vectors is essential to any assessment of future possibilities, 
particularly the possibility of a state-hood that meets the demands of 
the “People.”
This ethnographic account is based on three main engagements 
with collective action and activism in Egypt since 1985 up until 2014. 
The first source of engagement are reflections of the experiences that 
the author acquired as a citizen, born and raised in Egypt. Those ex-
periences concerned the transitions from state socialism, under late 
President Gamal Abdul Nasser in the sixties of the past century, to the 
liberal turn and Open Door policies of late President Mohammed An-
war Sadat. The transitions that Sadat initiated following the Arab-Is-
raeli confrontation in 1973 that had profound impacts on the social 
organization and political dispositions of the people of Egypt. Those 
transitions have also had indelible impacts on the political economies 
of the Arab region. 
The second source of engagements with collective action and ac-
tivism emerged as a college student in Egypt in the eighties and nine-
ties of the past century, after the assassination of Sadat by Islamic 
Jihadists in 1981 and the accent to presidency of Mohammed Hosni 
Mubarak. That period marked the declaration of a state of emergency 
from 1981 up until Mubarak’s deposition in February 2011 as well as 
the imposition of successive rounds of economic reform and structur-
al adjustment policies. The nature of the engagements with collective 
action and activism over that period were relatively more direct than 
the previous period, forged through participation in student and later 
faculty activism. 
The third source of engagements with collective action and activ-
ism emerged during the eighteen days of the uprising in Tahrir Square 
in Cairo in January and February 2011 and the events that ensured 
since then until June 2014. That period covered the deposition of Mo-
hammed Hosni Mubarak in February 11, 2011 and was followed by a 
period of transition under the Supreme Council of Armed Forces. As 
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will be argued below, instead of stirring the country towards democ-
racy through an interim phase of “transitional justice,” the council 
succeeded to divert events towards a counter-revolution. The engage-
ment as observant participant also covered the events around the first 
multi-candidate presidential elections in 2012 and the accent to presi-
dency of Mohammed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate. 
Yet, this account is neither a memoire nor personal reflections. 
Instead, it is an anthropologist’s analytical account of the main forms 
of social and political collective action between 1981 and 2014. It ex-
amines such forms with the aim to describe how various actors and 
groups engaged in them and to explain how both collective action and 
state action mutually constitute each other. The event that triggered 
this analysis was the uprising of January and February 2011. The ba-
sic problematic was to understand the pre- and post-uprising events in 
retrospect and to explain the forces and vectors that shaped collective 
action before, during and after the deposition of Mubarak’s thirty-year 
old regime.
Nevertheless, since an understanding of collective action by de-
fault begs questions of the response of state apparatuses. Therefore, 
this account also examines the nature of the state, albeit with a con-
ceptual twist. The first conceptual tool that this account uses is that of 
‘statehood.’ Instead of a single homogenous State, this account reveals 
how the state in Egypt has often assumed multiple avatars. Just as 
there are multiple forms of collective actions and actors, and mul-
tiple forms of capital, there are multiple forms of state. Egypt has 
developed post-colonial socialist-Nasserist version of state-capitalism 
as well as a neo-liberal profit-seeking state that competes with civilian 
entrepreneurial classes as will be elaborated below. Those forms of 
states emerged and still emerge in time-space in relation to multiple 
forms of capital at the national and regional scales. Similarly, since 
capital is a dynamic mode of production, exchange and consumption, 
so are the relations it produces and reticulates with the states. This 
dynamism could be analyzed through the concept of statehood, the 
process of social and political formation of states and collective ac-
tions (cf. Alexander & Bassiouny, 2014). 
Both components of the analysis – that of collective actions on 
one hand and of states and capitals on the other - when combined, 
could nudge actors and scholars alike to transcend rigid concepts of 
Activism, State and Capital. It could also allow scholars a more nu-
anced understanding of the processes of statehood and of the condi-
tions whereby institutions become porous and mutually constitutive 
of one another. More importantly, it has a normative disposition! It 
intends to enrich our capacities to think through the quagmire of the 
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present state of violence, disappointment and despair. The events that 
ensued after the deposition of Mubarak in 2011 took the turn of a 
solid counter-revolution and in 2014 the almost complete restoration 
of aspects of the old regime. This analysis intends to help us discover 
and imagine the possibilities of realizing the demands of the people 
for Bread, Freedom, Social Justice and Human Dignity through an 
emancipatory statehood. 
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THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY
This study focuses on the dialectical relationship between sovereign 
state agencies and collective activists and seeks to understand the vec-
tors that shape this relationship over time in order to identify the chal-
lenges that face citizens in their struggle to establish a statehood that 
continuously reflects their aspirations for Bread, Freedom, Social Jus-
tice and Human Dignity. It argues that a statehood that fulfills those 
aspirations is function of the ability of citizen- activists to sustain and 
expand their struggles against three vectors. Firstly, the interests of 
neoliberal elites (private and state-capitalists) within and outside sover-
eign state institutions. Secondly, the invasive fear of ‘terror,’ chaos and 
collapse of the state, society and the economy and lastly, the dilemmas of 
modern welfare-warfare statehood in a globalizing context. 
In order to achieve the objectives above this account will be or-
ganized in such a way as to answer the following sets of questions in 
order:
a)  What was the nature of the State in Egypt under Mubarak? 
What, if any, are the common factors between Mubarak regime 
and its predecessors in how they related to collective action? 
b)  Who are the main collective actors under Mubarak regime? 
What were their respective patterns of collective action and 
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their ideologies? When has there been cross-ideological collab-
orations or rivalries and over which demands and agendas? 
c)  What were the factors that led to the eruption of the uprising 
in January 2011 after thirty-one years under Mubarak regime? 
What is the nature of the uprising and was it the sole force be-
hind the deposition of Mubarak? 
d)  How did events unfold after the depositions and what are the 
lessons that activists and state agents have learnt from each 
other and from their own trial and errors?
e)  What are the confrontational events that, when analyzed, 
would help us understand the direction and nature of the trans-
formations in State structures and dynamics and in the modes 
and intensities of collective action? When put together within 
the economic context how would this lead to an understanding 
of the nature and process of statehood in Egypt post uprising?
f)  Is there a general loss of faith in the state? 
g)  What is the current state of revolution in Egypt and what are 
the possibilities for an emancipatory statehood that delivers 
the demands of the People?
A corollary set of questions concern the theoretical conceptual tools 
that anthropologists use in understanding social construction of state-
hood. Anthropology has often been accused of theoretical and meth-
odological inadequacy in the analysis of states. Validity of such ac-
cusations notwithstanding, the uprising and the events that followed 
lend themselves to the contemporaneity of anthropology’s theories 
and methods. This particular point will be elaborated in the sections 
on the analytical framework as well as following section on data and 
research methods. 
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NOTES ON METHODS:  
DIFFICULT TIMES FOR AN ANTHROPOLOGY 
OF REVOLUTION AND CHANGE
This study would not have been possible without a South-South Grant 
under supervision of International Development Economics Associ-
ation (IDEAs) in Delhi, India. The idea of the study began with the 
researcher’s interest to reflect on social and political transformations 
in Egypt a year after the January 25, 2011 uprising. Having partici-
pated in several sit-ins and protest marches as a student of Econom-
ics at Cairo University and later as a student of Anthropology at the 
American University in Cairo since 1985. It was imperative for me to 
understand why after a popular uprising that deposed a thirty-one 
year old despotic regime, there were brutal attacks on activists and 
why in June 2012 there were only two presidential candidates: one of 
them a member of the deposed regime and the other a member of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. I wanted to understand what makes a revolu-
tion and what does it take the revolution to be resilient in the face of 
counter-revolutionary forces. Along with hundreds of other activists 
from the broad category of the critical Left mass, who continue to 
dream of dignified citizenship, I sought to understand the possibility 
of such an ideal. 
The research grant made it possible to travel to Egypt for data col-
lection, observation and participation in post uprising citizens’ activ-
ism between February and July 2014. This has helped me gather data 
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from Cairo and Alexandria – the two main cities in terms of population 
size and GDP and sites of major protests and social movements. Data 
from this field leg corroborated data gathered earlier between January 
2011 and July 2012. Both field legs transpired during turbulent times 
and in particularly violent settings. Participant observation of activism 
implies tangible dangers of injury, harassment, and death or security 
police retaliation. This has made it difficult to take notes, interview 
people or record ‘events’ as and when they happen. Similarly, search-
ing for and access to secondary data and government documents took 
longer than during ‘ordinary’ times – if it were allowed at all. 
Other complications ensured. The Supreme Council of Armed 
Forces (SCAF) crackdown on four American pro-democracy research 
and advocacy organizations in January 20121 in the absence of rights 
to information law made it difficult for researchers – Egyptian or oth-
erwise - to navigate and access information and data. Similarly, the 
‘war on terror’ following the military coup that ousted Mohammed 
Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood in June 2013 established ended the 
possibility of access to data. It successfully established an emergen-
cy-like situation, even without any official statement declaring a state 
of emergency. This has placed – and still does – severe limitations to 
social researchers and journalists’ capacities to undertake field stud-
ies2. Finally, the anti-protest law passed under the interim transition 
government in 2013 put restrictions on activism and related inquiries. 
These factors are important not only for their implications on 
research methods but also as findings in their own right. While at 
one level, they indicate the continuation of Emergency era state in-
tolerance of pro-democracy forces. At another, they indicate a break 
away from Mubarak’s cosmetic tactics to pose as the defender of hu-
man rights in the eyes of international media and observers. Similarly, 
whereas the anti-protest law passed in 2014 gave a blow to collective 
action, yet years of progressive human rights activism supported by 
the use of internet resources gave rise to a number of research and 
documentation initiatives such as Center for Economic and Social 
Rights and The Egyptian Center for Public Opinion Research (Ba-
seera). The latter make available data and documents that were inac-
cessible if not unimaginable otherwise. 
This brings us to another important point namely, the reliabil-
ity of sources of data. WikiLeaks, social media and the internet 
1 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/30/egypt-military-scaf-ngo_n_1242884.
html Access on July 10, 2014 
2 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/egypt-finds-al-jazeera-
journalists-guilty-201462373539293797.html Access on August 10, 2014 
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technologies in general are increasingly assuming precedence over 
other modes of documentation and communication. Their capacities 
to record and instantly spread text and multi-media messages cannot 
be overemphasized. Their role in social mobilization before, during 
and after the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings have been the subject 
of several studies (Ghannam, 2011; Cottle, 2011; Tufekci & Wilson, 
2012; Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012). Nevertheless, two aspects of internet 
media are particularly pertinent to social science research and meth-
odologies namely, reliability and ethics. Although a thorough discus-
sion of both aspects is important not only for the present study but 
also for the entire range of social science studies in the twenty-first 
century. However, literature on either is dearth. At this point I want to 
raise three questions that affected the present study namely, how can 
the researcher verify videos and audios recorded on personal mobile 
phones? How can one ensure the safety of individuals both those who 
appear on multi-media and those recording them? How to use such 
sources without jeopardizing their copyrights? 
Concerning the first question, I followed the ‘classical’ method 
of triangulation whereby I would search online for multiple sources 
of the same event or incidence. I would then corroborate those with 
print media and published academic sources, if any. Blogs were also 
another type of data source. Whenever any blog appeared important 
for this study, I would either contact the blogger(s) or again verify 
through triangulation. Regarding the second and third questions of 
safety and copyrights, I did not insert any video or audio recordings 
into the content or text of this study that would jeopardize the safe-
ty of those involved. Similarly, I included only open source materials 
with explicit statements of the sources and date of access. 
Finally, while the study has started with the objective of under-
standing activism in general, during the course of fieldwork, activism 
in institutions of higher education emerged as a powerful vector in 
the transformations underway. Universities turned out to be vibrant 
spaces where state policies and citizen activism intersect, and higher 
education emerged as an integral arena in the struggles over justice, 
political participation and freedom. Faculty members of public uni-
versities and students 
Spearheaded the Egyptian Movement for Change - the first move-
ment to make explicit demands for political change in the 1990s. His-
torically, public universities have been sites of vibrant student activ-
ism since 1919 (Abdalla, 2008). Since the 1970s however, they have 
increasingly become fertile grounds for political Islam to interject the 
state by controlling curricula, university governance and elections 
of student unions and professional syndicates. It is even argued that 
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Islamist activists “acquired their first political skills during the 1970s 
while working with other student activists at Egyptian universities.” 
(Michaelle Browers3 (2007: 76) as cited in Soudias, 2014:55). For the 
above reasons it was deemed necessary to explore the history and dy-
namics of student and faculty activism4.
3 Browers, Michaelle. 2007. “The Egyptian Movement for Change: Intellectual 
Antecedents and Generational Conflicts,” Contemporary Islam, I (I): 69-88.
4 This study does not analyze labor activism in detail but it highlights incidences that 
are most relevant to the analysis of the uprising and the citizens-state relationship. 
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ANALYTICAL CONCEPTS:  
ACTIVISM BETWEEN MULTIPLE STATES  
& MULTIPLE CAPITALS
To understand collective action one need to find answers to the ques-
tions: what is the nature of the state in Egypt? Why have citizens re-
peatedly revolted against successive regimes? And, is there a general 
distrust of the State among the People? In this section, I will attempt 
to answer the first two questions by delving into the roles that the 
Egyptian state and successive regimes have played in supporting the 
People versus supporting a faction of them namely, private (national, 
regional, and transnational) capitalists. I will then explain how suc-
cessive regimes have resulted in what Alexander & Bassiouny (2014) 
called multiple states and capitals and how those have intersected to 
define the Egyptian statehood after the uprising and People’s senti-
ments towards the State.
Legions of scholars have established famous theories about the 
nature of the state in Egypt. For example, Karl Wittfogel’s theory of 
the hydraulic society argued how perennial agriculture necessitates 
a large bureaucracy, which in turn requires a despot on top to con-
trol, regulate and possibly, expand the empire. His Oriental Despotism 
was a famous reference to some historians (Ayubi, 1980) and con-
tinued to inform several analyses of the ruling regimes in Egypt for 
quite a while. Robert Springborg, for instance, characterized consec-
utive post-independence ruling regimes as “hybrid authoritarianism” 
(Springborg, 2009).
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There is no doubt that those esteemed scholars have based their 
analyses and characterizations on valid evidences. Nevertheless, their 
arguments are premised upon ecological determinisms that posit 
Egypt’s geographical location and the Nile as the ultimate determin-
ing factors of the nature of the state since times immemorial. The 
present study does not claim that such factors do not figure into the 
equation of the state in Egypt. They do. However, their relative impor-
tance fluctuates in response to other forces - or as this study claims 
- other vectors i.e. forces with measurable strengths and identifiable 
directions.
The Egyptian state has always been supportive of bourgeois cap-
italism. In 1919 and 1920, the state protected the fledgling Bank Masr 
by erecting tariff duties, buying locally made products and setting 
railway rates favorable to the bank’s national subsidiaries enterprises 
(Tignor, 1977). Tal’at Harb, the founder of the bank and its manager, 
believed in state support to national capitalism. He had assessed that 
the Egyptian bourgeoisie was not adequately capable of transform-
ing the Egyptian economy and had accordingly advocated carteliza-
tion as a means for the fledgling Egyptian industrial and commercial 
firms to establish themselves “In 1919, the vast majority of large-scale 
Egyptian financial, commercial, and industrial establishments were 
foreign financed and run. The estimated foreign holdings of shares 
and debentures in companies operating in Egypt amounted to LE 71, 
250,000 in 1914. An additional LE 85,680,000 of the public debt was 
held abroad. The total foreign commercial investments in Egypt were 
in excess of LE 200,000,000, the annual payments on which amounted 
to LE 9,000,000.” (Ibid. 181)
The Egyptian state support to national and foreign capitals con-
tinued after independence even though the Free Officers, who led the 
coup against the British and their monarchical allies had declared a 
socialist agenda premised upon massive nationalization of capitals. 
Nasser’s attempts to capture surplus from the colonially affiliate land-
owning classes and siphon it through state owned and run utilities 
fluctuated over the period between 1952 and 1968. Several scholars 
captured the transition in policy and argued that there were basic 
continuities between Nasser socialist and Sadat capitalist regimes 
in the ways the state supported private capital flows (Wahdan, 2007; 
Hosseinzadeh, 1988; Cooper, 1979). Cooper (1979) highlighted how 
during the pre-1967 aggression, although the Egyptian economy wit-
nessed a two-gap stagnation – a savings/consumption gap and a for-
eign exchange gap, there were “real gains” for the ‘masses.’
Nevertheless, due to the post-coup political vacuum (referring to 
state of formal and popular political organizations) Nasser’s regime 
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used the state to create a political base. Appeasing the ‘masses,’ par-
ticularly the lower and upper level bureaucrats through socialist pol-
icies had emerged as the regime’s most assured strategy to establish 
legitimacy and to further capitalist agendas without dissent. While 
under Nasser, the regime was a “form of semi populist, state capi-
talist, developmental nationalism” (Ibid. 482), that had not deterred 
economic liberalization, which jump-started in 1968. The 30 March 
Program of 1968 was a clear policy shift that targeted the educated 
middle classes, to which the Free Officers belonged. The outcomes of 
that shift eventually materialized into a powerful class of entrepre-
neurial bureaucrats and state capitalists, in addition to a strengthened 
class of private businesspersons involved mainly in capital-intensive 
and commodity imports (Mitchell, 2002).
Two of the most important strategies and – at once – outcomes 
of the policy shift concerned first, the rebuilding of the armed forces, 
not only as a crucial nationalist force but also as a capitalist enterprise 
with investments in capital assets and a broad network of sub-con-
tractors. The second strategy and outcome concerned the strength-
ening of capital flows from the ‘conservative’ Arab states. Although 
during the pre-1967 period a number of the Gulf monarchies were at 
odds with Nasser due to his support of anti-monarchy movements, 
this was rectified in the post-1967 period with Nasser’s defeat. 
The shift of policy from a near-complete state control of na-
tionalized assets and economy towards class-based state capitalism 
managed by elite bureaucrats and high-level army personnel had not 
passed without resistance. Especially after the 1967 defeat, with the 
army fragmented, and students and workers angered, “the expansion 
of the state was an effort to routinize the amorphous popular support 
it had enjoyed [pre-defeat]” (Cooper 1979: 486). The regime could no 
longer tout populism. Instead, the about-facing of policy to buy the 
core groups was more efficacious. It was also accompanied by brutal 
policing of dissent, particularly from the then well-organized Muslim 
Brotherhood movement. 
A thorough political economy analysis of how that policy shift 
had empirically affected capital value generation in terms of trade bal-
ance, resource use and income distribution is beyond the scope of this 
study. The main concern of this section though is to emphasize the 
concept of multiple capitals that resulted from Nasser and later from 
Sadat and Mubarak’s policy regimes. Similarly, the concept of multi-
ple states within the state is equally important for subsequent analysis 
of activism and statehood in the post-uprising context. 
Nasser’s policies have thus left Egypt with a state structure that 
is at once capitalist, etatist, populist and developmental. “What [was] 
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genuinely etatist about the structure [was] not that the new elite [was] 
located in the state, but that the new lower middle and upper working 
classes, in addition to the subproletariat, [were] dependent on that 
state” (Cooper 1979: 515). After Nasser passed away, Sadat inaugu-
rated the Infitah or the Open Door Policies in his October Working 
Paper of 1974 (Wahdan, 2012). Those sets of policies helped expand 
the range of ‘elites’ within the state by consolidating what Nasser’s 
30 March Program had instilled within public sector units namely, 
the imposition of ‘economic’ criteria on those units. Sadat sanctioned 
the establishment of what later under Mubarak came to be known as 
‘economic agencies.’ These were public sector utilities, which operat-
ed according to ‘scientifically rational’ profit making principles albeit 
within the state structure. Sadat also targeted the growing numbers of 
Egyptian laborers who migrated to the oil producing Gulf States, Lib-
ya and Iraq as well as Arab capital. His were policies of open market 
and trade that resulted in the consolidation of the state entrepreneur-
ial-bureaucratic class and the emergence of a comprador capitalist 
class – both Islamists and secular with variable relationship with the 
state (Beinin, 2005). Soliman (1998) analyzed the structures of both 
the industrial and the commercial capitalist classes in Egypt under 
Sadat and Mubarak and the modes of interactions they maintained 
with both regimes. However, a critical political economy analysis of 
how multiple factions of both state and private capitalists interface 
and on which scales (national, regional and international) is yet to be 
attempted. 
Alexander & Bassiouny (2014) attempted to reveal the multiple 
forms of state capitalisms in their recent Bread, Freedom, Social Jus-
tice: Workers & The Egyptian Revolution. They focused on how those 
forms and their respective classes related to state-controlled as well 
as independent labor activism(s), under the deposed regime and after 
the uprising. Their analysis is critical and normative and they argued 
that Egypt is currently in a state of permanent revolution. The present 
study shares this claim and argues that the possibility of a statehood 
of freedom, justice and dignity depends heavily upon the capacities 
of various forms of collective action to understand and interject the 
various forms of state and private capitals. Notwithstanding the im-
portance of labor activism, this study examines multiple states and 
capitals in Egypt on one hand and the dialectical relations between 
them and multiple forms of collective action. Included in this analyze 
is an examination of leftist and more importantly Islamist activism 
particularly the Salafi or scripturalist and the Muslim Brotherhood.’ 
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NEOLIBERAL EGYPT 2010: PEOPLE’S 
EGYPT ‘11: ISLAMIC EGYPT ‘12:  
MILITARY EGYPT ‘14
To begin to understand the uprising and the transformations that fol-
lowed, we will take a look at the social, economic and political indica-
tors over the period under the deposed President Mubark i.e. between 
1981 – 2011. Although abstract and reductionist, statistics is becom-
ing a universal means of communication. 
Egypt’s economy has often depended on oil. The oil economy is 
not only a matter of oil reserves. In fact, the latter have rarely, if ever, 
been a resource for exports. Nevertheless, Egypt’s oil economy encom-
passed direct investments in oil exploration and development as well 
as the remittances of multiple million Egyptian workers in oil-rich 
Gulf countries (Moench, 1988) 
According to Euromonitor on 18th December 2014, Egypt’s real 
GDP growth in 2010 was 5.1%. This has dramatically dropped in 2011 
to 1.8%. Earlier, in May 2014, Egypt’s fiscal deficit reached LE189.4 
billion, or 9.3 percent of Gross Domestic Product. At the same time 
last year, the deficit recorded LE204.9 billion, or 11.7 percent of GDP. 
Government expenditures hit LE519.7 billion between July 2013 
and May 2014, up by 9.6 percent from LE 474.3 billion in the same pe-
riod a year earlier. This increase was largely driven by increases in em-
ployee wages and compensation, with rose by LE28.9 billion to reach 
LE151.9 billion, and rising interest payments, which reached LE139 
billion, an increase of LE14.3 billion compared to the previous year.
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This increase came despite decreases in spending on subsidies, 
grants and social benefits, which stood at LE140.7 billion, down by 
LE9.4 billion. On the revenue side, the Ministry recorded LE337.8 bil-
lion, compared to LE271.3 billion the previous year. This figure in-
cludes LE51.5 billion in grants, including LE21 in cash from the Arab 
Gulf, as well as an allocation of LE29.7 billion worth of dollar denom-
inated deposits from the Central Bank. 
Taxes on domestic salaries amounted to LE17.5 billion, while 
taxes on industrial and commercial profits amounted to LE30.6 bil-
lion, including settlements made in December 2013 and January 2014. 
Property taxes, largely on Treasury bills and bonds reached LE14.2 
billion. Meanwhile, total government debt, both foreign and external, 
rose to LE1.9 trillion, or 93.9 percent of GDP, by the end of June 2014. 
The previous June, that figure stood at LE1.6 billion, or 93.8 percent 
of GDP1.
Those numbers have changed drastically in 2011 with the imme-
diate decline and subsequent entire collapse of the tourism industries. 
The table below illustrates the sources of Egypt’s oil economy since 
1981, the year Mubarak took Presidency.
While in 2013 particularly after the military coup that toppled Mu-
hammed Morsi, of the Muslim Brotherhood, United Arab Emirates 
stepped in to help Egypt restore stability. Year 2014 was the year of 
Emirati support with a stimulation bundle of US$4.9 billion and later 
1 http://www.madamasr.com/content/despite-slow-growth-finance-ministry-sounds-
optimistic-note Accessed on September 4, 2014
Table 1
Sources of National Revenues ($billion) 
Source 1981/2 2010 2011/12 2013 2014
Total Exports 4.4 26.99 25.07 26.98 26.11
Suez Canal 0.9 5.05 5.20 5.03 5.36
Tourism 1.0
Remittances 3.7 3.29 4.06 4.72 5.39
Total Imports 10.5 54.09 59.21 57.68 59.82
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with another US$2.5billion Both governments established an office 
for coordination in Egypt, headed by Sultan Ahmed Sultan Al Jaber. 
The office sponsors developmental projects worth US410 billion. Two 
billion of which is a no-interest grant deposited at the Central Bank of 
Egypt to help stabilize the Egyptian pound.

53
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS, INSTANCES  
AND THRESHOLDS
The table below is a compilation of ‘events’ since 2000 related to politi-
cal activism along with incidences deemed important from the periods 
during and after January 25, 2011 uprising. The list is not exhaustive 
nor does it represent a detailed chronology of particular forms of ac-
tivism. Rather, the selection below has three specific purposes. Firstly, 
it shows that the uprising in 2011 has built upon the experiences of 
at least five rounds of protest cycles that started in 2000 and continue 
until date. Secondly, it indicates that multiple parties have been in-
volved in violence and brutalities against civilians. Violence has not 
necessarily been perpetrated by the police and security forces only. As 
will be indicated below thugs hired by the policy and security forces 
as well as Islamist supporters and militias have also been involved. 
There were also incidences of brutalities and massacres meted out 
by the army upon civilians (both revolutionary groups and Islamists). 
Equally important the dates of some events and incidences list-
ed below are specifically significant as they represent anniversaries 
of earlier events. For instance, February 1, 2011 witnessed fierce bat-
tles in Tahrir Square between thugs on camels and protesters. While 
the final verdict over the culprit remains in the hands of an ongoing 
court panel of judges and while police investigations are currently 
underway, however, many activists who witnessed the event - later 
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nicknamed “The Battle of the Camel” argue that perpetrators were 
thugs hired by the police and security forces of the deposed Mubarak 
regime. On February 1, 2012, members of police and security forces as 
well as thugs dressed in civilian attire closed down the Port Said City 
main football stadium immediately after the match between Al-Ahly 
and Al-Masry Clubs was over and meted violence and brutalities upon 
supporters known as the Ultras killing 77 young men. Again, the final 
verdict on the culprits remain an open debate in court. However, the 
event was well documented in state media and on cameras of personal 
mobile devices.
It should not be inferred from the chronology below that there 
has not been any forms of activism, protest or social movements in 
Egypt before 2000. This is far from the truth however; a chronolo-
gy of activism before 2000 lies beyond the scope of this study unless 
deemed relevant to the present analysis. As will be indicated below, 
thirty years under a state and law of emergency in Egypt since 1981 
have made it dangerous to protest or raise voices for political reform. 
Citizens could protest peacefully and demand anything but changes in 
the ruling regime. The President, his family members, the closely-knit 
circle of clientele and advisors were a taboo. Nonetheless, students 
and workers protested, organized sit-ins, strikes and marches – some-
times violent – since the early years of the 1980s. Those have been syn-
chronic with successive economic reform and structural adjustment 
agreements between the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund and successive governments under the deposed President Hosni 
Mubarak. Equally important were the massive protests in response to 
the Palestinian Intifada (uprising) in 2001. 
Moreover, the list combines general dates (year) and specific dates 
(day of incidences) in order to cover specific thresholds along with 
more general factors that affect the trajectory and thus the analysis of 
activism and citizens-state relations.
1991 Inauguration of the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment 
Program (ERSAP) under guidance from the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund
Passing of Law 203/1991 specifying the privatization of several 
public-sector undertakings and firms
2000 Protests in solidarity with the Palestinian Intifada
2001 – 2002 Cairo University students march daily to the Israeli embassy and 
class with security forces
Coptic Christians demonstrate against discrimination pertaining 
to legal restrictions over building new churches and renovating 
old ones.
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Unemployed youth demonstrate in 16 governorates for several 
days culminating in protests in Part Said governorate.
Mass demonstrations in Tahrir Square commemorating the 
anniversary of the Palestinian Intifada .
Emergence of the coalition of opposition movements and groups 
under the title of Egyptian Popular Committee for Solidarity with 
the Palestinian Intifada (EPCSPI) also known as the Popular 
Committee or al-Ligna al-Sha’biya
9000 demonstrators, mostly Muslim Brotherhood affiliated 
students of Alexandria University marched outside campus gates. 
Security forces used rubber bullets and buckshot to disperse the 
crowds
2003 Inauguration of the second round of ERSAP
Massive demonstrations protesting the war on Iraq. The aim was 
to push protests further unto public squares and outnumber riot 
and security police forces
February 2003 Government declares the floating of the exchange rates. This 
resulted in a 40 percent loss of value of the Egyptian Pound vis-à-
vis the US Dollar and a steep rise in prices of commodities
February 15, 2003 Thousands of Egyptian riot police cordon 500 antiwar protesters in 
downtown Cairo then follows them through street corners
March 2003 Anti-war demonstrations erupt in all university campuses in Cairo 
and protesters occupy Tahrir Square for 12 hours (El-Hamalawy, 
2011)
Another massive demonstration in front of Al-Azhar Mosque with 
estimated 55,000 protesters (Hassan, 2003)
First debut of explicit anti-regime slogans and banners with 
“Mubarak! Leave! Leave!”
2004 Cabinet reshuffling and Mubarak appointing six businesspersons 
as ministers. More privatization measures and stricter imposition 
of Emergency Law
The Egyptian Movement for Change also known as Enough 
Movement or Kifaya
2005 Parliamentary Elections swept by members of Mubarak’s National 
Democratic Party and Muslim Brotherhood running for elections as 
independent. The MB was yet a movement without formal political 
party
2006 – 2007 Food prices rose between 33 to 146 percent for meat and chicken 
without concomitant increase in wages and the revival of labor 
strikes (Beinin & Vairel, 2011)
2007 Relay of labor strikes; estimated 500,000 workers within months 
across the country (Ibid.)
55,000 Property-Tax Collector Nation-wide Strike
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2008 Emergence of April 6 Movement in Mahala Kobra Governorate (site 
of textile manufacturing industries)
2009 – 2010 Relay of labor strikes. Brutal subduing of a call for general nation-
wide strike (Carr, 2008)
A spate of “terror arrests” *
December 2010 21 killed in bomb at church in Alexandria where Christians had 
gathered to mark the New Year
January 25, 2011 Tahrir Square Uprising
February 11, 2011 Mubarak Steps Down
February 14, 2011 A Six-Months Plan
February 25, 2011 Supreme Council of Armed Forces Takes Charge of Transition and 
crushes new protests
March 9, 2011 Protesters Arrested – Around 150 male and female protesters tried 
and convicted in military courts
May 2011 Mamdouh Shahin, Official Spokesperson of SCAF announced that 
the military should not be under any Presidential whim (Martin & 
Taylor, 2011)
July 2011 SCAF controlled the drafting of the constitution under the pretext 
of establishing and protecting a secular state
October 9, 2011 Maspero Massacre: Armed forces, Islamist militants and the 
deposed regime thugs crush Christian protestors outside the 
National Television and Radio Building near Tahrir Square
November 28, 2011 Muslim Brotherhood sweeps Parliamentary elections
February 1, 2012 Police and security forces kills 77 young men during a football 
match between al-Ahly and a
l- Masry Clubs in Port Said City Stadium in retaliation for al-Ahly 
Ultras’ (fans of Ahly Club) participation in January 25, 2011 
uprising.
May 23, 2012 Presidential Elections between two finalists: Mohammed Morsi of 
the Muslim Brotherhood and Ahmed Shafiq, the last Prime minister 
under Mubarak
June 15, 2012 Military shuts down the parliament under a Supreme Court ruling
June 30, 2012 Morsi sworn in as President
August 12, 2012 Morsi orders top generals to retire in return for ‘safe exit’; he 
chooses Abdul Fattah El-Sisi, former head of military intelligence 
as Minister of Defense
* http://m.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13315719 Accessed on August 30, 2014
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November 21, 2012 Morsi decrees all Presidential actions above constitution
November 29, 2012 Islamists under tutelage of the Muslim Brotherhood drafts a new 
Constitution
December 4, 2012 More than 100,000 protestors march towards Itihadiya 
Presidential Palace in Heliopolis, around 20 kilometers from Tahrir 
Square
January 25, 2013 Protesters celebrate two-year anniversary of the uprising in 2011 
by gathering in Tahrir Square; brutalities of Islamists thugs lead to 
injuries
February and March, 2013 More protests in major cities
April, 2013 Tamarod Movement (Rebel) emerges petitioning for impeachment 
of Mohammed Morsi
June 21, 2013 El-Sisi warns Morsi after Tamarod gathers around 22 million 
impeachment signatures from eligible voters
June 29, 2013 A concession between Sisi and Morsi; the latter revokes
June 30, 2013 Million protesters return to the streets
July 1, 2013 Military gives ultimatum
July 3, 2013 Military coup removes Morsi from office
July 4, 2013 Adly Mansour, Supreme Court Chief Justice steps in as interim 
president
July 8, 2013 Morsi supporters gather in Cairo and Alexandria; police guns them 
down leaving at least 50 recorded deaths
July 9, 2013 United Arab Emirates and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia pledges
July 26, 2013 Massive rally for El-Sisi to take over as President
July 1,2013 Muslim Brotherhood declares an open-ended camp in front of 
Rabia Al-Adawiya Mosque in Cairo, protesting the military coup 
and the ousting of Mohammed Morsi
August 14, 2013 After several ultimatums, the military bulldozes protesters in what 
is known as Rabia Massacre
August 22, 2013 Mubarak released from prison but remains under house arrest
September 1, 2013 Morsi and most top members of the Muslim Brotherhood who 
were arrested and in police custody are charged with “committing 
violence and inciting the killing of innocent civilians”
September 5, 2013 Mohammed Ibrahim, Minister of Interior survices a deadly car 
bomb
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September 10, 2013 Start of a popular campaign to encourage El-Sisi to run for 
presidential elections
September 11, 2013 The military declares the beginning of an offensive against 
Islamists militancy following two suicide car bombs blasting one of 
the office branches of the Egyptian Intelligence
2013 – 2014 Successive cabinet reshuffling; mostly unwelcomed by 
revolutionary groups yet celebrated by what came to be known as 
counter-revolutionary forces and regimes
April 2014 Passing of Anti-Protest Law
August 2014 Political Prisoners Start Indefinite Hunger Strike
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CONTEXTUALIZING CHRONOLOGY:  
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM
The chronological order above is useful as it imposes a linear trajec-
tory on events. It also lists the broad range of collective action in dif-
ferent parts of Egypt over decades. It has become a ‘theoretical habit’ 
to resort to social movement theories and theories of political oppor-
tunity structures to explain episodes of collective action (McAdam, 
Tarrow, & Tilly, 2007). These theories can explain few movements in 
Egypt such as the Muslim Brotherhood or the Egyptian Movement 
for Change but they fail to explain other forms of collective action 
and counter-action adequately. In the latter case, theories of political 
opportunity structures constraining social movements and/or collec-
tive action as well as theories of the mobilizing structures that enable 
them become pertinent. 
It cannot be denied that modes of political activism, made possi-
ble under the deposed Mubarak regime have – for good or bad - put 
in place specific structures of opportunities and constraints and spe-
cific mobilizing structures that shaped subsequent forms of activism 
and of statehood. For instance, the ascension of Islamists namely, the 
Muslim Brothers to the seats of political power in 2012 was not sud-
den and should not be seen as a surprise. It was wrought out of per-
sistent and protracted struggles to ‘Islamize’ society and to infiltrate 
state institutions since the 1920s. The collectivity of ‘political Islam’ 
has managed to Islamize polity and redefine the meanings and shape 
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of the struggles for bread, freedom, social justice and human dignity 
that erupted in January 2011. 
However, can the former theories explain the uprising? When 
the uprising erupted gradually and protestors began to occupy Tahrir 
Square, several international media referred to the scene as a revo-
lution. Protestors elated over such news while many were skeptical. 
Questions about the nature of the uprising still preoccupy analysts; 
was it an instance of venting out frustrations that built up over years 
of oppression or a full-fledged revolution with deeper and more pro-
found change in society, economy and polity? 
Similarly, can such theories explain the forms of collective ac-
tion that ensued afterwards? Such as the brutalities and violence of 
the Supreme Council of Armed Forces in 2012 or the sudden appear-
ance of Mohammed Morsi and Ahmed Shafiq on the political stage 
as contenders for Presidency, who, until then, were relatively obscure 
figures? Can such theoretical frames explain the striking failure of the 
democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood President and his Isla-
mist-backed government to gather enough support from long-term 
activists, the neoliberal elite (also known as felool or remnants of the 
deposed Mubarak regime) or even from apolitical citizens (nicknamed 
Couch Party)?
The answer is no. They equally fail to explain adequately the suc-
cess of the impeachment campaign organized to support a military 
coup in 2013 or the subsequent ‘war on terror’ and war on activism. 
Media sensationalism and emotional over-charging notwithstanding, 
a genuine attempt to explain the nature of the transformations by 
looking at the forms and sequencing of collective action is not suf-
ficient. A thorough understanding of the framing processes i.e. how 
protesters make sense and give meanings to the structures of opportu-
nity and constrains and to their experiences could supplement analy-
sis and give a better perspective. 
However, meanings are socially constructed1. Individuals, groups 
and institutions construct them at once, historically and geographi-
cally as well as diachronically and synchronically. Therefore, in order 
to understand the meanings of “Bread, Freedom, Social Justice and 
Human Dignity” or for that matter the meaning of activism and of the 
uprising or revolution, the analyst must begin to draw the history and 
the geography of resistance and power that underlie and lead to the 
uprising and beyond. She must also begin to trace the changes in both 
1 The importance of framing processes as an addendum to the theoretical framework 
came after a blog post by Ahmed Bakr on the website of the Revolutionary Socialists 
on September 9, 2014. Revsoc.me/politics/30532 
61
Dalia Wahdan
the historical and geographical or spatial modalities that give collec-
tive action its forms, magnitudes and meanings (Pile, 1997). 
If the protracted activism listed chronologically above is con-
ceived of as resistance to the domination of the state and its oppressive 
regimes and if power is heuristically defined as the ability to enforce 
ones’ will on others. Then can resistance imply power? Can it affect 
domination? If yes, then what forms of resistance can best impact 
upon forms of domination? Steve Pile (1997) suggests we study the 
histories and geographies of resistance by uncoupling them from dom-
ination and focusing on the tactics and the meanings that groups and 
individuals give to their multiple modes of resistance(s). He urges us to 
understand how geographies of resistance need not necessarily reflect 
geographies of domination or read as mirror images of domination. 
Instead, resistance can very well be towards change in any form. 
“Spatial technologies of domination – such as military occupation 
or, alternatively, urban planning – need to continually resolve specific 
spatial problems, such as distance and closeness, inclusion and exclu-
sion, surveillance and position, movement and immobility, communi-
cation and knowledge, and so on. This is to say that authority produc-
es space through , for example, cutting it up, differentiating between 
parcels of space, the use and abuse of borders and markers, the pro-
duction of scales (from the body, through the region and the nation, 
to the globe), the control of movement within and across different 
kinds of boundaries and so on… Nevertheless, these spatial practices 
of oppression do not mean that resistance is forever confined to the 
authorized spaces of domination. Indeed, one of authority’s most in-
sidious effects may well be to confine definitions of resistance to only 
those that appear to oppose it directly, in the open, where it can be 
made and seen to fail” (Pile 1997: 3). 
 These words rightfully depict much of the tactics of activists in 
Egypt under emergency and later after Mubarak. The theoretical frame 
suggested by Pile also seems to imply methodological suggestions. To 
render resistance visible, the analyst can begin to draw a mental map 
of the positioning of individual activists and groups in circles of en-
gagement with each other and with dominant authorities. In other 
words, analysis should yield a description of the map of unequal and 
multiple power relationships. This step facilitates the identification of 
relative proximity of activists to each other and to authorities. 
Since more or less powerful people are active in the constitution 
of relationships, resistance can mean resistance to change of posi-
tions, to progressive and radical politics and to social transformation. 
Resistance can be understood by thinking about the ways in which 
spaces of resistance are distinct from the spaces of domination. “It 
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can be understood by thinking about the distinct spatialities of resis-
tance and by suggesting the resistance may involve spatialities that lie 
beyond power!
Similarly, the intentions of political acts of resistance are not 
straightforward and need not necessarily coincide or justify the spe-
cific nature of the act. For instance, the intention to emancipate and 
empower might be brought forth through acts of violence and aggres-
sion. In Egypt of the 1950s and precisely in 1952 when a military coup 
ousted the Egyptian Monarch and declared independence from the 
British rule. The path towards empowering the poor passed through 
brutal dispossession and annexation of the lands and properties of 
the rich. Fascism is roughly understood in those terms i.e. “sickening-
ly sadistic regimes can be grounded in emancipator values” (Ibid.4). 
This methodological tip will prove useful in understanding the popu-
lar support of the military coup that ousted the Muslim Brotherhood 
and declared them as a terrorist organization in 2013. 
This discussion is at its base a discussion of structure and agency. 
The positions that individuals and groups occupy are socially con-
structed. At one level, social forces construct a structure of relation-
ships that gives rise to positions and locates them vis-à-vis each oth-
er. It also defines their functionality within the overall structure. The 
analyst needs to identify the underlying logic of that structure. This 
study supposes that collective activists and social movements occupy 
multiple positions in their dialectical relationships with the state and 
oppressive regimes, whether socialist or neoliberal. They also occupy 
multiple and changing positions vis-à-vis each other. The logic that in-
forms the state is, ideally, that of social stability, economic prosperity 
and territorial sovereignty. 
The logic that informs social movements is different. For in-
stance, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, striving to establish an Is-
lamic Umma that transcends state territoriality and national affilia-
tion have often worked on maintaining loyal followers of a politicized 
set of doctrines enshrined in religious language. More importantly, 
they have often followed the principle known in Islamic jurisprudence 
as “Al-Taqqiya” (secrecy for self-protection against enemies). In both 
cases, the rationale that guide actions and resistances is analytically 
important for figuring out positions in the overall structure. 
It should not be inferred from the above discussion that the state 
and social movements are internally homogenous entities, without 
divisions, or that they occupy non-changing positions in the over-
all structure of relations. In Egypt, the state has often succeeded to 
conceal the divisions within i.e. between its sovereign institutions, 
and appear as homogenous, and even omnipresent. Thirty years of 
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Emergency have successfully shielded the state from exposing its di-
visions and thus vulnerabilities. Ditto, the Muslim Brotherhood as the 
largest organized movement in Egypt at the time of the uprising. This 
study presents evidence that persistent activism up until the uprising 
and beyond, has exposed such vulnerabilities, even when national, re-
gional and international media have consistently portrayed activists 
as fragmented and non-cohesive. 
Since positions are socially constructed, therefore, they change 
actively or reactively in response to changes in the logics that inform 
the social structure. The analyst must be able to read the changing 
map of positions in light of such logics. The present study seeks to un-
derstand positions of resistance in light of multiple logics. The macro 
logic of economic reform and structural adjustments. The positions 
taken within the political opportunity structures under successive hy-
brid authoritarian regimes. The logic of fear and terror perpetuated by 
the state and Islamists and the logics, if any, of activists. 
The logic of divide and rule has often been successful to sustain 
vulnerability. People remain vulnerable where they cannot organize 
and agitate in defense of their own interests and where alliance cannot 
be formed with groups sharing common interests. As will be shown 
below, the 2013 anti-protest law and the strict enforcement of its arti-
cles is premised upon the same logic and ensures the perpetuation of 
such vulnerabilities. The strategy of benign non-action or neglect has 
also served similar purposes. The relative marginalization of revolu-
tionary youth as rash, badly educated, unskilled and unemployed i.e. 
as a threat to the recovery and development of the national economy. 
Similarly, albeit from another angle, the anxiety of media over “haybat 
al dawla” (State Prestige) in light of street collective action and upris-
ings are examples of how the analyst could read the scene. 
In conclusion, the present analysis of activism follows social 
movement theory, the new social movements’ theory; theories of polit-
ical opportunity structures, mobilization structures and framing pro-
cesses to explain the nature and trajectory and dynamics of activism 
that lead to the 2011 uprising. However, when it comes to understand-
ing and explaining post-uprising activism, this study benefits from the 
theory of geographies of resistance to explain the logics that recon-
struct relations of oppression and hegemony. Nevertheless, as will be 
demonstrated below, the same theory i.e. geographies of resistance, 
will reveal the ebb and flow of revolutionary activism in Egypt and 
might allow us to imagine future visions of a just and dignified citi-
zenship in a civic state for Egyptians. Moreover, over the course of the 
analysis, I will provide definitions of any concept that arises outside 
this short exposition of the theoretical frame of analysis. 
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THE UPRISING: A SUCCESSFUL PROTEST 
WITH SEEDS OF COUNTER-REVOLUTION!
On 25 January 2011, Egyptians took to the streets demanding the 
deposition of the ruling regime and the ousting of the former presi-
dent Hosni Mubarak. Having raised the national flag and chanted slo-
gans of nationalist hues, several commentators argued that the upris-
ing was non-religious i.e. it was not inspired or instigated by Islamists. 
During the days of the uprising, protesters represented various ideo-
logical hues and many could not even be aligned with any particular 
political or ideological current. On the streets, religious and secular 
groups and individuals had joined forces under the common banner 
of “bread, freedom, social justice and human dignity.” 
The success of the popular uprising to depose the regime left 
Egypt in a state of uncertainty. The country became exposed to vari-
ous and competing political and ideological vectors, which have been 
oppressed under the protracted state of emergency - declared upon 
the assassination of Anwar Sadat and the ascendance of Mubarak to 
power in 1981, or have sprung up in response to the novel circum-
stances. For months after the uprising, exhilarated activists and dem-
onstrators worked night and day not just to clean Tahrir Square, but 
also to continue vibrant dialogues while multiple forces competed and 
coalesced. Understanding the complexity of this period and the sheer 
momentum of such vectors is essential to any reliable interpretation 
of the shape of the post-uprising Egyptian state.
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Several commentators sought to figure out the features of the 
seeming chaos and uncertainty. Bert Olivier articulated it as a man-
ifestation of “modernity as crisis;” a period that possessed an equal 
potential for the emergence and the death of democracy. On one hand, 
the revolt was an instance of the release of “socially immanent, cre-
ative forces of social and political change, and on the other the reac-
tionary powers of order” (Olivier, 2011). His evidence, among others, 
was the inability of Egyptian and Western governments to identify 
leaders for negotiations over the shape of things to come. This and 
the lack of the classical tangible manifestations of liberal democra-
cy made him argue that the situation immediately after the uprising 
possessed the potential of an anarcho-democracy where the state was 
rejected as a frame of reference and “the people” were able to organize 
and self-rule, even innovate an alternative structure altogether.
What followed the uprising particularly the military takeover un-
der directives of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) was 
to Olivier the counter-revolutionary scenario and the triumph of the 
forces of order endemic to modernity-as-crisis. While there is little 
doubt that the period between the uprising in 2011 and presidential 
elections in 2012 had tinges of anarchy but to argue that it represented 
a living case of modernity-as-crisis we need to consider more factors 
than its leaderless revolutionary groups and counter-revolutionary 
maneuvering. 
The uprising was not a revolution; protestors might not have 
even imagined it to be. It was however, built upon decades-long so-
cial movements and mobilization efforts. Retrospectively, SCAF and 
members of the deposed regime and their allies saw the uprising as 
a sign of revolutionary change sweeping the national territories and 
launched counter measures, but it is through activists’ responses to 
these measures that a genuine revolutionary change might take shape 
albeit within palpable survival, political and economic constraints. 
Bayat distinguished between social and protest movements. Com-
pared to social movements, which are protracted processes of mo-
bilization for change, protest movements are brief insurgencies that 
“directly challenge the political authority” and might accomplish their 
goal or get crushed (Bayat, 2007). By this definition, the uprising was 
a successful protest movement and the question becomes what are the 
potential for it and the challenges facing it to evolve into a revolution 
i.e. “a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the domi-
nant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social 
structure, leadership, and government activity and politics”? (Samuel 
Huntington’s definition of revolution as quoted in Bayat (2007, p 214 
endnote 20). 
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Whether rapid or otherwise, this study attempts to answer the 
above question by identifying the strengths and the challenges that 
face those who protested in making fundamental changes to state-
hood in Egypt. Based on observations and participation in demon-
strations and collective activities intermittently between January 2011 
and July 2012, I will reflect on these experiences through the lenses of 
social movement theories in order to understand the current Egyptian 
statehood – defined as the process of dynamic interactions between 
formal institutions of the state (legislative, executive and judiciary) on 
one hand and non-state actors (social movements, collective actions 
or informal citizen groups) on the other.
Although classical social movement theory (SMT) such as McAd-
am, Tarrow, & Tilly (2007) does not explain how popular uprisings 
develop into revolutions or even into interest groups that seek funda-
mental change, applying some of SMT tenets to the case of post-up-
rising activism in Egypt is informative. It explains several features of 
pre- and post-uprising activism; the case would expand the theory’s 
conceptual repertoire and further demystifies the tenacious assump-
tions that Arab and Muslim majority societies are essentially unique 
(Beinin & Vairel, Introduction: The Middle East and North Africa Be-
yond Classical Social Movement Theory, 2011; Bayat, 2007) and ‘their’ 
politics are either a matter of “a culture of rioting” or a “culture of 
deference” (Vairel, 2011).
Egypt has known social movements1 since the late nineteenth 
century working within and outside state institutions towards instill-
ing ‘modern’ political subjectivities. While some movements infused 
such subjectivities with religious sensibilities such as the Islamic re-
form movements of 1875 – 1940s (Gasper, 2009), including the Mus-
lim Brotherhood of 1928 and its affiliates of militant Islamists such 
as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and al-Jamaʻa al-Islamiya of 1990s as 
well as its revised version following the path of preaching and social 
services or what global media like to call the “moderate” path (El-Gho-
bashy, 2005; Bayat, 2007). 
Other movements carved a different path towards political subjec-
tivities such as the communists, the leftist and nationalists, and the Nas-
serists. Since the late 1990s and early 2000s, another form of movements 
emerged. These were mostly extra-parliamentary coalitions between 
1 Social movements are collective actions that aspire to effect change in society or 
polity through sustained engagements. They usually identify opponents or targets 
for change and work to establish sympathetic or loyal constituencies through long-
term strategies within social institutions or short-term tactics within formal political 
structures. 
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individuals, established movements, non-governmental organizations 
and political parties. The Egyptian movement for change (Kefaya) is 
an example as well as the March 9 movement for Academic Freedoms, 
the Egyptian Anti-Globalization Group and the March 20th movement 
to mention few (Abdelrahman, 2009). Other movements operated out-
side these classical categories such as the massive welfare associations 
working through churches and mosques and the celebrity-preachers’ 
circles of religious education such as Amr Khaled and Khalid al-Jindi as 
well as few other female preachers since the early 2000s. 
Writing before the uprising, many scholars had rightfully ques-
tioned the success of those movements to change authoritarian re-
gimes, some had argued in reference to non-militant Islamists that 
their goal was stealth regime change through moral rectitude of so-
ciety and gradual constitutional changes (Bayat, 2007; Rutherford, 
2006). Others have traced democratic transition and questioned the 
possibility of democratization through civil society organizations; 
not through partisan politics (Langohr, 2004). Nevertheless, almost 
everybody acknowledged that Egypt witnessed vibrant political activ-
ism, the “extra-ordinary, extra-usual practices which aim, collectively 
or individually, institutionally or informally, to cause social change” 
(Bayat, 2005, p. 894 emphasis in original).
Now that Mubarak had stepped down and a non-military presi-
dent elected – albeit with major qualifications over how elections were 
conducted, has this vibrancy been sustained? If yes, how far is activism 
able to effect fundamental changes and realize a state that provides the 
demands of protestors in Tahrir? In other words, how far is post-upris-
ing activism able to transform into a revolution to build a “modern civ-
ic state”? There is little doubt that levels of activism upsurged in Egypt 
after the uprising accompanied by relentless efforts to document it by 
activists and observers. In fact, almost everybody has turned into a his-
torian of sort. However, while many wait and watch, a number of so-
cial scientists have made bold attempts to theorize the transformation 
through the lens of social movement theory (Beinin & Vairel, 2011; 
Shehata, 2011). In all instances, scholars look at the past to assess the 
present modes of activism. In this and the following section I will dis-
cuss few selected examples of activism in the past and make a number 
of theoretical reflections as well as pave the way for an assessment of 
its potentials for fundamental social and political change. 
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PRE-UPRISING ACTIVISM: FLUID AND 
NETWORKED AGAINST REPRESSION
By way of classification, Fawzy (2011) divided pre-uprising activism 
and movements into two categories namely, movements that seek po-
litical change and ones that rally behind the demands of one or more 
sector of the population, which he titled “matlabiya” or demand-ori-
ented movements. This is an arbitrary distinction at best because 
under the prevasive repression of the deposed regime the very act 
of protesting was itself a manifestation of the demand for political 
participation. This distinction resurfaced after the uprising in state-
run media in order to demonize protests by several sections of the 
population and portray them as opportunists seeking personal gains 
when the country passes through critical times. I do not wish to deny 
that demands vary from movement to the other but rather to register 
a tendency to conflate declared demands and undeclared motives of 
protestors in theory and in practice. Understanding the differences 
between the two and for that matter between ‘rights’ and ‘principles’ 
is important in analyzing the potential of post-uprising activism to 
develop into a revolution.
A more empirically valid distinction however, is drawn between 
activisim through traditional institutions such as political parties, 
charity organizations, NGOs and human rights organizations on one 
hand and activism that emerged forcefully during the 2000s of more 
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fluid nature. In 2004 alone, 250 prtotests were recorded; this was es-
timated as 200 percent increase compared to 2003 (Soudias, 2014). 
Essam Siyam (2011) conducted a survey of random days between Oc-
tober 1st 2005 to Januray 31st 2009 and analyed protest activities re-
ported in three diverse newspapers on selected days. Statistical anal-
ysis indicated that 58.6% of reported protest activities took place in 
provincial cities and towns outside the two prime cities of Cairo and 
Alexandra (together counted for 41.6%). The distribution of who pro-
tested was such that 84.8% of protest activities was undertaken by 
collectivities and groups not necessarily related by blood or ideology 
compared to 8.4% by individuals, 4.4% by members of single families 
and 2.4% by groups of families (Siyam, 2011). 
The study indicated other emerging patterns such as the resur-
gence of labor activism particularly in the textile and industrial man-
ufaturing sectors as well as the emergence of cross-ideological and 
cross-class student activism. However, most notable was the engag-
ment of slum dwellers, employers and employees of small and me-
dium enterprises and the self-employed in public protests. Equally 
impressive was activism among public services sector employees, pre-
dominantly of ministeries and institutions of education and higher 
education, which constituted 12.4% of the total number of recorded 
cases of protest over the study’s random period. These were the very 
sections of employees whom the deposed regime used to mobilize in 
support of its policies. It was noticeable that 80.9% of recorded pro-
tests happened outside and independent of the traditional frames of 
political participation i.e. political parties and NGOs; it was incited 
by the protestors, not by experienced activists (Ibid.). In constrast to 
Fawzy’s argument, except for few instances, the demands raised in the 
majority of protests were not limited to protestors’ respective occu-
pational or class related consumption, instead, they represented mul-
tiple inspirations and desires for political and intellectual freedoms, 
anti-repression, anti-corruption, anti-profiteering. 
Similarly, while studying the rapproachment between leftists and 
Islamists that occurred after the second Palestinian Intifada in 2000, 
Abdelrahman observed how pre-uprising activism was cross-ideolog-
ical and fluid. While maintaining their individual and institutional 
differences, in alliances, “none of [the movements acted as] a sin-
gle, homogenous, united front representing a monolithic political 
camp... [Rather, many, if not all, were characteristed by] internal con-
flicts and subgroups and divisions” (Abdelrahman, 2009, p. 38). She 
demonstrated how diverse movements, even arch-enemies displayed 
remarkable fluidity in alliances, raised various related demands and 
rallied around multiple issues. The Egyptian Popular Committee in 
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Solidarity with the Intifada was a national initiative that began by 
campaigning for blood and money to Palestinians then rallied around 
political reform. Out of this committee came the annual “Cairo Con-
ference” where non-partisan opposition forces came together under 
anti-war (US-UK invasion of Iraq in 2003), anti-neoliberalisation (IMF 
and World Bank structural adjustments of the Egyptian economy) and 
a bit later anti-inheritance of presidency (against Mubarak renewal of 
term and his son’s succession) banners (Browers, 2007). 
Besides fluidity, most social movements were internally dynamic 
and sometimes discordant. So, if we take a look at leftists as an estab-
lished category in the literature, we would see how - whether parties 
or movements, leftists in Egypt have often had endemic divisions over 
ideological orientations, programs, strategies and tactics. Before the 
uprising, this camp included the Tagammu party, the banned commu-
nist party, the Revolutionary Socialists movement, the People group, 
and the Democratic Left group (Abdelrahman, 2009). Long before the 
uprising in 1976, the Tagammu had already morphed into the Na-
tional Progressive Unionist Party (NPUP) to include socialists, com-
munists, Arab nationalists and Nasserists. Compared to others in this 
camp, the Tagammu party was able to sustain favorable relations with 
the Political Parties Committee appointed to oversee political parties 
in Egypt under Mubarak (Stacher, 2004). After the uprising, Refaat 
Al-Saeed, president of the party had not supported the popular move-
ment, compelling 73 of the party’s committee members to resign in 
March 2011(Choucri, 2011). 
In contrast, Hamdeen Sabahi’s explicit antagonism of Mubarak’s 
regime had cost him the suspension of formal registration of Kara-
ma party until after the uprising and not to mention persecution and 
imprisonment. Similarly, Revolutionary Socialists were forced to op-
erate as an underground movement whose members were frequent 
inmates of the national security forces prisons. So, there are discrep-
ancies between leftists in how they related to Mubarak regime and to 
the uprising. Several defectors from the NPUP were already political-
ly active outside the party platform, through formal and less formal 
movements and initiatives. In fact, multiple memberships in social 
movements and initiatives outside restrictive party memberships, has 
increasingly been the norm of political activism since the early 2000s.
Islamist activism is no less fluid. Within the expansive literature 
on this large category of activism, sometimes called political Islam, 
Islamic activism is conceived of as urban protest movements that 
accommodated yet resisted established worldviews and oppressive 
regimes (Macleod, 1991; Al-Sayyid Marsot, 1984), as social services 
organizations by and for the middle classes (Bayat, 1998), as a means 
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of suppressing and mediating social conflicts and a means for capital 
accumulation (Beinin, 2005). Beyond description, Islamic activism 
remains open-ended. Scholars from diverse hues continue to exam-
ine this broad category and “only by induction can one construct a 
Muslim political philosophy” (Hicks, 1989, p. 32). Figuring out the 
main featues of this philosopy would enlighten our understanding of 
Islamist activism and might presents us with a case that could expand 
theoreties of activism from advanced democratic contexts.
Beinin associated Islamist activism with the defeat of Arab 
armies against the Israeli, British and French’s in 1967, successive 
global economic stagflations since the 1970s till late 1990s, and the 
decline of Arab nationalism as a rallying project. Earlier, Hicks had 
alluded to the same point. He stated, “onto [the] Islamic core with its 
emphasis on morality and justice, all other concerns such as national 
independence, Arabism, economic progress, social justice and polit-
ical equality were easily grafted.” (Hicks, 1989: 34). Hicks was refer-
ring to the origins of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1920s. 
In a manner similar to how the British betted the Muslim Broth-
erhood against movements and agitations calling for independence, 
the neoliberal turn in Egypt under Sadat, however, implied betting on 
Islamists against leftists, Nasserists, socialists and communists. By 
the time Mubarak was in power, Islamic activism had bifurcated into 
militants and preachers, both rich with petro-dollars and massive 
human capital of young people who were deeply enculturated into 
diverse versions of a mythical Islamic essence, way of life and disposi-
tion yet marginalized by inefficient governments. Both factions made 
a dent on Egyptian statehood. Whereas the violence of the first fac-
tion forced the state to retaliate and justified its pervasive repression 
and inflated security measures, the activities of the second faction 
managed to Islamize state discourses (Bayat, 2007; Beinin, 2005). 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to recap the ideological, 
strategic and tactical transformations of either factions of Islamic 
activism or to list how the state was socialized into integrating re-
ligion into its discourses. Instead, I will briefly discuss the Muslim 
Brothers as an illustrative example of pre-uprising activism i.e. fluid, 
cross-ideological, internally dynamic and networked. El-Ghobashy 
(2005) demonstrated how the Muslim Brothers have transformed 
over years of interaction with other activists, with the regime as well 
as intergenerationally in ways that deviated from its trademark ide-
ology after establishing a faith-based state built upon morally correct 
nation (umma). 
Since its emergence in the 1920s as a diligent movement seek-
ing moral rectitude, the The Muslim Brotherhood have consistently 
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adapted to changing contexts. From door to door recruitment to its 
cause and a militant paramilitary wing capable of inflicting violence 
onto the state to a pervasive movement that molded its ideologies and 
organizational tactics in tandem with the exigencies of capital and in 
reaction to state economic programs and repression. This versatility 
allowed them to infiltrate several state institutions such as student 
unions, professional syndicates, social clubs, schools and higher ed-
ucation institutions and mosques and to strike alliances with liberal 
(al-Wafd) and left-leaning (Labor) parties to wrest their way into Par-
liament (Stacher J. A., 2004, 2002). 
Their Guidance Bureau (Maktab al Irshad) has often brought rad-
icals next to advocates of women’s rights in public posts; militants 
next to preachers. Even as a banned organization, they spared no po-
litical opportunity to play the “dual game” characteristic of partisans 
viz. between hitting at the regime’s legitimacy and mobilizing voters 
alternately or simultaneously. Finally, what started as an attempt to 
“win Egyptian hearts and minds for an austere Islamic state and soci-
ety….was .. irrevocably transformed into a flexible political party” one 
that “confirms that it is the institutional rules of participation rather 
than the commandments of ideology that motivate political parties” 
(El-Ghobashy, 2005, p. 390). El-Gobashy wrote this before the upris-
ing and the official formation of the The Muslim Brotherhood’s Free-
dom and Justice Party in 2011. However, she meant to demonstrate 
that they manifested features similar to other non-religious activists 
and argued that they need not be theorized as a unique anomaly. 
It is partly this fluidity and networking that brought together Is-
lamists, nationalists, Nasserists and leftists before the uprising as a 
popular front. Abdelrahman (2009) and Browers (2007) underscored 
three principles that guided such rapproachement. Firstly, partner-
ship in the alliance was not restricted to institutions but left open on 
individual basis in order to avoid institutional clashes and ideological 
antagonism. Secondly, movements drew upon tactics learnt through 
interacting with global networks of activism which necessitated and 
was premised upon the use of advanced communication technolo-
gies. Thirdly, alliances were premised upon negotiation and reach-
ing a consensus over issues, tactics, slogans, types of confrontational 
action and alternate plans in response to state repression. Fourthly, 
activists agreed over “differential coordination,” whereby partners 
in an alliance would maintain a unified front while simultaneously 
keeping their differences in dealing with their respective constituen-
cies. Notwithstanding their differences, it was implicitly agreed that 
negotiationsn were between equals thus networks were predominant-
ly “acephalous” (Abdelrahman, 2009). 
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Cross-ideological alliances have already been effective among 
university students particularly while organizing for independent stu-
dent unions and mobilizing against state security intervention in cam-
pus and university lives since 2000. They were created to capture op-
portunities or face threats made by the state and its multiple sovereign 
agencies (See Shehata & Stacher, 2007 for analysis of Al-Azhar Militia 
event). Although it consumed substantial energies and time, alliances 
and networking were learning mechanisms that generated experien-
tial repretoires. Mobilizing for alliances was generally premised upon 
the shared belief that movements were subject to similar threats and 
that cooperation in a plural milieu was more productive than waring 
as rivalries under the umberella of opposition. 
This plurality created “imagined solidarity” (Bayat, 2005) where-
by individuals and groups internalized such “generalized believes” and 
“shared values” around which their “collective mind” worked (Tarrow, 
1988). This imagined solidarity contributed to the appearance of pro-
testors as a popular front movement and gave impetus to “We the 
People demand the fall of the regime” (“Al-Shaab Yorid Isqat al Ni-
zam”). It was this “cognitive liberation” (Tarrow, 1988) that sustained 
the uprising and bestowed upon the days that immediately followed it 
the appearance of anarachy and arbitrary self-rule. 
However, was this extra-ordinary activism the actual force that 
deposed Mubarak? As much as one would wish it, there were several 
factors behind Mubarak’s decision to step down and behind deterring 
the military and security forces from crushing the uprising violently, 
even though they tried. Those factors were exterior yet supplementary 
to the sheer force of protestors in Tahrir. Yet in terms of momentum, 
there was surely one faction of activists powerful enough to propel 
other forces and make them come to work in the direction of regime 
change, these were the workers unionized independently over years 
and in several strategically important sectors of the economy such as 
the Suez Canal Authority. This paper does not focus on their activism 
although extensive studies have analyzed it, instead in what follows I 
will turn to the transitional period between Mubarak’s deposition and 
the election of Mohammed Morsi, member of the Muslim Brother-
hood and the first non-military President since 1952. 
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WARRING DEMOCRACIES:  
MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD  
AGAINST STATE SOVEREIGNTY
The period that immediately followed the uprising was turbulent and 
seemingly messy. It was characterized by daily street confrontations 
between activists and remnants of the deposed regime, particularly 
thugs and police and security forces. It was also a period of incessant 
intimidation of revolutionary groups by state-run media loyal to the 
deposed regime and by private media owned by businesspersons of 
the deposed regime as well as by Islamists (both Salafi organizations 
and /or by the Muslim Brotherhood.) It was also the period during 
which the public image of the January 25 uprising, particularly of 
activists from outside the Islamist camp was subjected to deliberate 
distortions. Explicit accusations of ‘clientelism to the West,’ ‘aposta-
sy,’ and ‘treason’ were purportedly heralded at activists such as mem-
bers of the April 6th Movement, Wael Ghoneim, Executive Director of 
Google Middle East and Mohamed El-Baradei, Nobel Laureate and 
former Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
Nevertheless, strikes erupted on daily basis along with an expan-
sion of pervasive forms of resistance1. One of the most prominent 
forms was the emergence and spread of independent federations and 
1 “Labor protests on the rise,” Al-Masry Alyoum, Monday 17/09/2012.
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syndicates such as the Independent Federation of Trade Unions. The 
latter was distinctively democratic and in conflict with the state-run 
Egyptian Trade Union Federation. There were calls for similar inde-
pendent unions across the broad spectrum of formal and informal 
occupations2. 
Focusing predominantly on labor activism, Anne Alexander 
tracked the developments that transpired over the period between 
February and October 2011 in the forms of activism, the demands 
raised and the lessons learnt. She divided the period into three phases. 
The first was between February and March, during which sit-ins in 
workplaces spread. The second lasted March through August and wit-
nessed the growth of workers organizations such as the abovemen-
tioned independent federation. The third covered September to Oc-
tober and was characterized by repeated, coordinated, large presence 
strike episodes. Those were coordinated on the national scale and 
were sometimes entire or sector-wide strikes such as the nation-wide 
school teachers’ strike. (Alexander, International Socialism, 2012)
Alexander notices how labor activism has made advances during 
this transition period. For instance, strikes lasted longer than before 
the uprising and involved representatives, directly elected from the 
crowds. She adds that the state no longer resorted to direct repres-
sion measures. Instead, the government institution or the employer in 
question sent delegates. In the process of negotiating demands, work-
ers’ representatives acquired experiences not available to them before. 
Similarly, one of the advances made over this period concerns the or-
ganizational and democratic experiences acquired by labor activists 
throughout the process of organizing a strike, from its initiation until 
building independent organizations. 
Although resorting to less direct repression measures has re-
duced, the state however, follows the strategy of benign neglect such 
that when a strike begins, state institutions do not respond thinking 
that protesters would disperse after fatigue. To the contrary, the slow 
response often intensified demands and forms of activism. In the cas-
es that Alexander reviewed, it has escalated workers’ demands from 
“generalized social demands with a degree of common purposes” to 
those of social justice against the imperatives of neoliberalism and the 
purging of public institutions from corrupt authoritarianism (Ibid.). 
This dynamic was repeated during the strike organized by univer-
sity non-teaching staff unions. A relatively neglected group within in-
stitutions of higher education, public universities’ staff has often been 
2 Alexander (2012) stated that in October 2011, Egyptian Federation of Independent 
Trade Union claimed membership of 1.4 million workers. 
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discriminated against in terms of work conditions and pay scales. 
When the staff of Cairo University organized an indefinite strike in-
side the university campus in September 2011, the Dean of Faculty 
of Economics and Political Science (FEPS - seat of several Mubarak 
loyalists) responded – after days - by arbitrarily transferring twen-
ty-six staff members and employees from their positions in the Fac-
ulty administration to the central administration. In response, pro-
testers escalated their demands to include the de-militarization of the 
university. A similar protest was organized by the staff of Beni Suef 
University in Upper Egypt. In this case, top administrators neglected 
the sit-in until students joined the protesters and anti-administration 
slogan were raised. When the President of the University requested 
a member of the teaching Faculty to represent the striking staff, the 
latter refused and the university top administration requested security 
police to disperse the crowd by force3.
Equally significant yet unseen since 1952, was the call for civ-
il disobedience. The Egypt Revolutionaries’ Alliance – a coalition of 
over fifty activist groups, including the country’s six most prominent 
revolutionary movements — along with university and school stu-
dents and independent workers’ unions campaigned for the initiative. 
Among the political groups which participated were the January 25 
Revolution Youth Coalition, the April 6 Youth Movement, the Youth 
for Freedom and Justice Movement (a Muslim Brotherhood affiliate), 
the Revolution Youth Union, the Wasat Party and the Ghad Al-Thawra 
Party. The Egyptian Cinema Syndicate and some Coptic groups, such 
as the Maspero Revolutionaries, have also backed the call. SCAF re-
sponded by deploying more security and army tanks in several squares 
in major cities. 4 
It is important to note at this point that the responses towards la-
bor activism organized and sustained through the independent trade 
unions differ from the responses towards the strikes by university 
staff. While the former triggers antagonism from government institu-
tions and state-sponsored workers’ unions, regional governors as well 
as the ruling military junta, SCAF. The latter triggers resentment from 
three class categories namely, students and parents, teaching staff and 
top administrators. While activism intensified, so did resentment to 
repeated blockades causing daily hustles and damaging economic 
conditions.
3 The strategy of neglect intimidates protesters yet it could prove counter-productive. 
The longer the sit-in, the more sympathy protesters could elicit from the public. 
4 http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/34104/Egypt/Politics-/
Egypt%E2%80%99s-experimental-steps-to-civil-disobedience.aspx
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Nevertheless, the rapid transition and developments taking place 
during this period had exposed how networks and positions within 
the structure of political opportunity and the structures of mobili-
zation were continuously redefined. The rapid rate of events, almost 
hyper-activity, did however, impose an empirical as well as a meth-
odological imperative namely, that of identifying and readings sig-
nals sent by actors in the political opportunity structure. Meyer and 
Minkoff (2004) had made a slight modification to the classical theory 
of political opportunity structure. They distinguished between struc-
tures of the political system and the signals that the system sends to 
its various components, including protest movements and collective 
action5. 
This theoretical tweak became pertinent to this period in particu-
lar during which both activists and analysts were busy identifying and 
deciphering signals not only emitted by SCAF or state-run media but 
also by other groups, who participated in pre-uprising activism and 
were present in Tahrir and other squares in Egypt during the eigh-
teen days. There were also rapid changes within the government such 
as the appointment of four consecutive cabinets over a single year. 
Cabinet reshufflings included incumbents, who were members of the 
deposed regime. This development had sent ‘uncomforting’ signals to 
the broad spectrum of activists.
On the other hand, the rapid rate of economic deterioration justi-
fied why the Supreme Council of Armed Forces urged a speedy transi-
tion period by suppressing activism, at least street activism and intim-
idating non-governmental organizations and human rights advocacy 
initiatives6. Meanwhile, state-owned media as well as privately owned 
media began a discourse of crisis and fear of total collapse of the econ-
omy. A spate of unverifiable news about the economy, polity and even 
regional geo-strategic transformations were significant weapons of 
the ‘counter-revolution.’
5 David Pratten (2006) argues that analysis of activism must cleverly distinguish 
between tactics and strategies. The former are predominantly associated with the 
“poor” or those who lack power, whereas the latter is reserved from the strong.
6 The arbitrary clamp down of four US-funded think tanks was already mentioned in 
the section on data and research methods above.
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MULTIPLE STATES + MULTIPLE CAPITALS = 
MULTIPLE SOVEREIGNTIES 
After deposing Mubarak and his Parliament, there was no formal 
existent political system as such. However, several sovereign state 
agencies remained almost intact such as the Supreme Constitutional 
Court, the Highest Administrative Court, and the General Prosecutor 
– against the dismay of multiple revolutionary groups including the 
Muslim Brotherhood and their supporters. Other agencies boosted 
their powers such as the military, whereas some agencies underwent 
reshuffling yet retained substantial influence over public opinion such 
as the state-run media – albeit in competition with privately owned 
media - print, social media and satellites. While the Muslim Broth-
erhood seemed content with those developments, the revolutionary 
youth and groups became increasingly wary of an impending resto-
ration of the old regime. Activists interpreted these developments as 
signs that the uprising succeeded to depose Mubarak yet did not result 
in dismantling his entire regime. 
State institutions in the Egyptian context have always been polit-
icized and rarely, if ever, been outside the purview of the “political.” 
Therefore, by highlighting a select number of agencies, I seek to illus-
trate how the political system is reconfiguring and how could this be 
a sign of deviation from the dialectics of violence that characterized 
the relations between state and activism under the deposed regime. 
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One of the concepts that could assist in this task is that of sig-
nals. Modifications to the classical political opportunity structure 
theory brought signals sent by the political system as an umbrella 
concept to refer to state policies. The latter were found to be diverse 
and multi-dimensional. Policy could be the formal recognition of a 
social movement or sanctioning state budgetary relays or passing or 
amending laws. State policies in Egypt have often come in fluid forms; 
sometimes in the form of speeches made by a state official. After the 
uprising it has become more fluid hence the usefulness of the concept 
of signals in understanding the dynamics between state and activism 
in the post uprising period. I also wish to underscore how the “tran-
sition” was a learning mechanism that disillusioned activists, politi-
cians, statesmen, the “public” as well as social scientists on exigencies 
and dilemmas of modern civic statehood.
Immediately after Mubarak stepped down, in the white heat of 
the uprising, jubilant, enthusiastic and self-confident, activists started 
organizing around rebuilding state structures. Ground activities were 
energized and extended geographically and many coalitions and alli-
ances were forged particularly between members of what was lumped 
later as the “revolutionary youth” camp. A joint statement by 13 Egyp-
tian NGOs immediately after deposition of regime called on the tran-
sitional government to draft a clear plan for the gradual activation of 
all economic, social and cultural rights to meet the demands of the 
uprising. 
Articulate demands and suggested plans for restructuring state 
institutions were systematically raised to SCAF generals who system-
atically ignored them. In response several activists demonstrated reg-
ularly in Tahrir and mounted makeshift stages from which representa-
tives and spokespersons addressed the public, presented programs or 
listed names of trusted figures while audiences walked around listen-
ing and debating. One of the dear demands that went unheeded con-
cerned the formation of a national committee of civilian and military 
figures to draft a new constitution based on transparent criteria of 
selection of participants. Instead, or in deliberate neglect, SCAF an-
nounced a referendum on the old and defunct 1971 constitution and 
in March 2011, people took to poll stations against many activists’ and 
intellectuals’ intuitions and wills. 
Although it did not escape many activists and intellectuals that 
SCAF was deliberately creating a constitutional void, the results of the 
referendum were informative in many ways. Egyptians were asked to 
accept or reject amendments to the articles on the president’s author-
ities and terms in office; no amendments on the article that stated the 
Shariʻa as the principle source of legislation – which was antagonized 
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by “secular” intellectuals. Nevertheless, 41.19% of 45 million persons 
who are eligible to vote (18,537,954 persons out of a total population 
of around 85 million1) turned out at poll stations. 77.2% voted in favor 
and the rest were against (El-Labbad, 2011). 
These figures can make sense only in context of the campaigns 
that preceded the referendum. Three main strands of discourses ran 
through the campaigns. The first was a state-run media strand that 
roughly spun around ‘voting as a national obligation and a first-time 
taste of democracy.’ The second was an Islamist strand, where ‘No’ 
was Haram (sinful) and ‘Yes’ was the duty of a true Muslim. The 
third was a critical strand that tried to spread the word that a defunct 
constitution cannot be patched. Meanwhile, SCAF had been actively 
spreading fear of a constitutional and security vacuum and of eco-
nomic collapse. 
The highest rates of “yes” came from remote provinces, which 
were relatively neglected from the purview of political activists over 
years, compared to Cairo, Giza and Alexandria with the lowest rates 
of approval. The provinces with powerful labor movements and those 
with large Coptic Christian populations had predominantly opposed 
the amendments. El-Labbad (2011) interpreted voting patterns ac-
cording to the relative strength or weakness of Islamic activism on one 
hand and the historical economic structures of each province on the 
other. So, provinces of the Suez Canal zone, along the Israeli-Egyptian 
borders, which have suffered protracted neglect by state development 
programs and had heavy presence of The Muslim Brotherhood and 
other Islamist activism, had more support and less opposition to the 
amendments. Similarly, the majority of approvals came from provinc-
es that were previously the main constituencies of the defunct Nation-
al Democratic Party (Ibid.).
In the immediate aftermath of the referendum, many spots across 
the country witnessed violent clashes between Coptic-Christians and 
Muslims- the two main religious ethnicities. SCAF and state-run me-
dia took advantage and portrayed the clashes live examples of how 
things could turn out if Egypt emerges into an Islamist state with re-
ligion as basis of full citizenship. Conversely, rumors spread anxieties 
over the alleged immoralities – like the legitimization of alternate sex-
ualities - associated with the secular state that separates religion from 
politics2. This period - between the referendum and Parliamentary 
1 By that time, the infrastructure for non-resident Egyptians (estimated as 6.5 million 
persons in 2008) had not yet been installed. 
2 Random and informal personal communications with members of the public on 
several occasions in Tahrir Square between May – July 2011.
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elections in 2011- witnessed the resurgence of violence reminiscent 
of the deposed regime perpetrated against activists by military police, 
the state security forces, renamed national security forces, and hired 
thugs in civilian attire. Activists responded by escalating protests and 
diversifying activities as well as establishing several vigilance groups 
to follow up events and campaign against the rule of the military 
raising the slogan “Down with the Rule of The Junta” “Yasqot yasqot 
hokm al askar.” Kazeboon (liars) was a particularly vocal campaign 
organized by media specialists and university professors who relied 
heavily on short videos, rappers and visualizations of street fights to 
scandalize brutalities3. 
Atef Said articulated the paradox of this period by analyzing the 
ambivalent location of the military as a sovereign state institution in 
society. Although it is a sovereign agency, the army is organically so-
cial, drafting around 75% of Egyptian youths. It historically symboliz-
es Egypt’s modern statehood and gives it legitimacy particularly after 
the 1952 coup and the 1973 war. It is at once an economic empire 
controlling from 15 – 40 % of the national economy and operating 
as a military-industrial-business-commercial complex in partnership 
with the American military industrial complex (Said, 2012, p. 399). 
Kinninmont (2012) added that as an economic empire, the army’s in-
terests in maintaining land and property prices and in the growth of 
tourism cannot be overemphasize. Similarly, it would be unlikely that 
the army would look favorably on economic liberalization especially if 
the latter brings greater competition. Over years, for SCAF economic 
reforms meant social unrest and foreign debt equaled loss of national 
sovereignty. Therefore, “the military is likely to oppose protests and 
strikes as economically and politically disruptive and to avoid reforms 
that challenge its privileges and scrutinize its budgets” argued Kinnin-
mont (2012).
This ambivalence notwithstanding, Said did a better job of re-
freshing our memories of how the army was deployed to suppress ri-
ots and the revolt in 1977 and 1986 respectively and how this affected 
the image that the army enjoyed in society then. What I am trying to 
stress here is that during the “transition” the military tried to rely on 
its “credit of good deeds” among the people and to constantly tap into 
its role in “protecting the revolution” during the uprising. A claim that 
worked well with several factions of Egyptians particularly those who 
did not participate in the uprising but failed to convince protestors 
3 http://www.arabist.net/blog/2012/1/14/the-kazeboon-campaign.html; http://en.wiki-
pedia.org/wiki/Kazeboon
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especially when it came in stark contradiction to the violence with 
which the army dealt with them and in light of SCAF deliberate ne-
glect of demands from Tahrir. 
Other sovereign state agency such as the Supreme Constitutional 
Court (SCC) and the Supreme Administrative Court came forceful-
ly into the dynamic, also projecting ambiguous if not outright con-
tradictory signals. Particularly significant was SCC’s ruling out the 
law passed by Parliament in April 2012 to bar Mubarak-era figures 
from high politics and its subsequent dissolution of Parliament and 
the transfer of legislative powers to SCAF in June 2012. SCAF issued 
a unilateral constitutional declaration that disallowed the president 
from declaring war without SCAF’s approval; the army can intervene 
to quell any domestic instability and the council had the power to 
form its own constituent assembly in the event that obstacles emerge 
in the draft of a new constitution plus the generals had the veto over 
the existing assembly work. 
This particular paradox must be seen in light of the structure of 
the Egyptian bureaucracy and of sovereign state agencies. Historians 
of the Egyptian bureaucracy and technocracy vouch that few agencies 
operated with the objective of servicing citizens. Instead, many were 
machines and mechanisms of capital, status and power accumulation 
(Mitchell, 2002; Waterbury, 1993). This has shaped the manners each 
agency aligned in differential patron-client compacts with the deposed 
regime and especially with the apex institution of the presidency. 
The deposed president, his diwan and small coterie of business-
persons selectively favored and disfavored one or the other sovereign 
agencies and certain factions within each. This partly explained why 
none of these agencies was monolithically unified. It was a presiden-
tial discretion to appoint incumbents or to indirectly establish and 
mobilize mechanisms within sovereign agencies such as the Commit-
tee of Political Parties to achieve specific goals or many times to de-
ploy outright intimidation through security services (Brown, 2012). 
With the absence of the presidency with its omnipresent discretionary 
powers, many agencies are currently engaged in battles for survival 
and consolidation of gains.
Picking the thread from Said (2012) even the military had its in-
ternal divisions and those who populated them were not “equal cli-
ents” to the autocratic patron. The same applies to the cases of the Su-
preme Constitutional Court whether in the instance mentioned above 
or historically (Moustafa, 2007). Even while projecting a self-com-
posed image, SCAF sent ambivalent signals when it unexpectedly 
raided a number of US research NGOs in December 2011 and when it 
careened in selecting its preferred presidential candidate (from Omar 
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Sulaiman, former director of the Egyptian Intelligence Agency and 
spokesperson for the deposed president to Ahmed Shafiq a fellow mil-
itary man who headed the Egyptian Agency for Civil Aviation). SCAF 
did not even quell the fears of the public and revolutionary forces over 
an alleged pact with the The Muslim Brotherhood over the presidential 
candidates (El-Ghobashy, 2012; Said, 2012; Stacher J. , 2012). 
Earlier Madgi Khalil (2006) had argued that the “[Egyptian armed 
forces] have no quarrel with the Islamists –quite the opposite in some 
cases—however, this is a power conflict and not an ideological one …
The armed forces will not concede power, and would wage war on any 
potential competitor” (p. 52). Similarly, SCAF’s position regarding the 
law on barring members of the deposed regime from political partici-
pation and its appointment of Kamal Al-Ganzoury who was a member 
of the deposed regime as prime minister. Virginity tests were another 
action loathed by many. All these signals contributed to cracking the 
aura of awe that surrounded the military. Instead of deterring pro-
tests, they emboldened young protestors to confront the generals and 
urge the public to “Say it and Don’t be Afraid: SCAF must leave” “Oul 
- matkhafshi: el Askar lazem yemshi.”
Signals aside, state-run media consistently bombarded audiences 
with manufactured anxieties over the deteriorating economy, a rap-
id decline in national monetary reserves, the collapse of services and 
utilities, and absence of security on the streets. All the while intimi-
dating and farcical trials of members of the old regime were staged4; 
rumors about the size of Mubarak’s fortune and the possible retrieval 
of the stolen money were spread even though no court case or official 
requests were made on behalf of the government5. Similarly, farcical 
announcements were made about some US$ 6 billion kept in 4,737 
“private funds” or treasuries installed by the deposed regime in many 
sovereign state agencies outside the purview of official budgets6. 
There is no doubt that turbulence would reflect economic indi-
cators, however, the persistent lack of transparency makes it difficult 
to verify those fears. Kinninmont discussed the results of a poll con-
ducted by Gallup Abu Dhabi in 2011 which asked people to respond 
to feelings of safety versus the actual experience of crime in a number 
of provinces in Egypt. The results showed that it was the former that 
4 Interview with Galal Amin, Professor of Economics at the American University in 
Cairo by Yousri Founda 
5 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19459177 accessed on October 20, 
2012.
6 http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/35554/Business/Economy/Private-
funds-to-enter-state-budget,-says-Egypt-fi.aspx accessed on July 10, 2012.
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has significantly increased even as the latter remained constant (Kin-
ninmont, 2012, p. 10). 
Nonetheless, there are palpable anxieties over societal divisions. 
Compared to the referendum that divided votes into Ay and Nay, the 
presidential elections divided the “nation” into three seemingly neat 
camps: “dregs” i.e. those who supported or sympathized with the de-
posed regime, the “revolutionary forces” an umbrella label for activists 
including Nasserists, liberals, nationalists, socialists and communists, 
and the Islamists of all hues whether loyal to the The Muslim Brother-
hood or followers of the so called Salafists. Earlier, the Parliamentary 
elections have produced “two parallel universes: one of the transition 
and one of revolution” (Stacher, 2012, p. 2) with SCAF playing them 
against each other while violently suppressing street politics. 
Writing immediately before the presidential elections, Stacher di-
agnosed the situation as fragmenting. “The protesters [have become] 
the wild card ….they appear weakened [yet] for the time being, they 
will have to channel their energies into defeating single items on the 
SCAF and Muslim Brother agendas as opposed to trying to dislodge 
an incumbent. This task will keep them relevant, but the question re-
mains whether the protesters can mature into a more reliable and 
cohesive political actor” (Stacher, 2012, p. 2).
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What are the possibilities of becoming “more reliable and cohesive” 
now that a civilian elected president is in charge? The discussion at 
the beginning of this paper of the nature of social movement activism 
before the uprising contains much of the answer to this question. The 
Egyptian Movement for Change (Kifaya) movement in particular is 
worthy of closer inspection. Years of diligent involvement of its found-
ers with the regime have given them the experiential repertoire not 
only of how to mobilize but also how to do so across ideologies. The 
movement comprised of Islamists, Nasserists, nationalists and left-
ists. Many members were at once public employees (university faculty 
members, judges, journalists etc.) and insiders of sovereign state in-
stitutions. These factors had at least three consequences. Firstly, they 
produced participatory democratic involvement within the movement 
that spilled over to other realms of activism through the members’ 
mobility between movements. This is detectable in the way some 
post-uprising initiatives such as independent syndicates of informal 
labor are run. 
Secondly, it exposed activists to the broader connections between 
phenomena. This awareness reflected in how activists articulated de-
mands and programs for political, executive and judicial reforms as 
will be demonstrated below. Thirdly, and most importantly it rendered 
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obsolete the binaries that the regime deployed to categorize activists 
and activism such as between “radicals” and “moderates” and hence 
manufactured easy targets for oppression and repression. This last 
consequence is illustrated by examples of Kifaya members who de-
fected or were forced to defect from the The Muslim Brotherhood such 
as Abdul Moneim Abul Fotouh, Assam Sultan, abu Al Ila Madi and 
formed what some scholars uncritically label “Wasatiya,” post-Isla-
mist or center-moderate activism (Stacher J. A., 2002). 
Similarly, membership in Kifaya and the involvement with mobi-
lizing for alliances and setting of explicit principles for coordination 
and action have nurtured a “political sensibility” that transcended the 
religious-secular binary characteristic of modern political rationality. 
This sensibility could partially explain why group prayers in Tahrir 
during the uprising did not intimidate seculars or cause fissures be-
tween protestors throughout the eighteen days (Hirschkind, 2012). 
This sensibility is a positive force that cannot be reduced to instances 
of “imagined solidarity,” which - some scholars argue- results from 
successive “protest cycles,” though it could definitely contribute to 
it. It is a socially produced sensibility through protracted processes, 
which if harnessed a nuance democratic statehood wary of ethnic/
identity popular politics would be made possible. 
Before the uprising, there were around 14 movements and initia-
tives (Abdelrahman, 2009) after the uprising, there were around “10 
to 20 million activists”ʻ (Asad, 2012). Regardless of numbers, the use 
of advanced communication technologies and associations with glob-
al movements in addition to ground confrontations with the military 
police and anti-riot forces have sparked activists’ ingenuity and skills 
to organize diverse forms of protest and mobilization such as general 
strikes, hunger strikes, riots, sit-ins, and recently calls for civil disobe-
dience1. There are also other forms such as the popular committees. 
These are spontaneous groups that started by residents of apartment 
houses or neighbors of houses in single streets to defend their prop-
erties and public utilities during the uprising and in response to news 
that criminals were deliberately released from prisons. 
Based on observation, these committees continued after the up-
rising in some streets in Imbaba, Sayda Zeinab and Heliopolis neigh-
borhoods but were reorganized such that young people predominantly 
school and college goers took charge to undertake short-term commu-
nity activities such as cleaning of streets, whereas others have come 
1 From Tariq Al-Bishry’s Call for Civil Disobedience in 2004 to Rabab El-Mahdi 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O2lAdwAE2Gc accessed in October 27, 2012.
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together to form popular coalitions such as in Ard Il-Liwa.2 Few such 
committees deliberated campaigns to cleanse local government units 
from remnants of old regime and have formed vigilance groups of in-
dividuals with no particular ideological affiliation who invest most of 
their time and energy monitoring day-to-day events in their respective 
lesvigilance signals out as potentially repressive, contradictory, hypo-
critical or corrupt. 
If need arises, members of this vigilantes would travel to across 
the country to report in response to informants’ messages. Hundreds 
of Facebook pages attest to this cross-class vigilante activism. Similar-
ly, professionals have joined in the vigilante band wagon such as the 
Egyptian Initiative to Prevent Corruption. This is a group of lawyers 
working together to draft anti-corruption legislation to present to the 
new government as well as a group of journalists active in drafting 
rights to information law (Kinninmont, 2012) 
However, some commentators have pointed out a palpable frag-
mentation of networks of activists after the uprising in response to 
some “logic of fear” and suspicion of isolation and marginalization 
of Islamists and the “revolutionary forces” respectively (Asad, 2012, 
p. 272). This is apparently valid when juxtaposed to the polarization 
of voting patterns in the March 2011 referendum and in subsequent 
parliamentary and presidential elections. It is also predictable in the 
context of the anti-revolutionary activities of sovereign state agencies 
and the signals they emit. Fear and suspicion are manufactured and 
are part of the dialectics of violence that regulates the relationship be-
tween state agencies on one hand and between the state and citizens 
in general and activists in particular. 
After the uprising, state-run media has consistently attempted to 
demonize “disruptive” protests activities; at times using religious dis-
course – inviting popular Islamic preacher Amr Khaled to campaign 
the return to stability. Many activists during the “transition” and later 
have made decisions in response to state agencies’ signals as well as 
in response to the actions of other activists and in light of their own 
resources. When SCAF decreed the new political party law in 2011, 
social movements had to make a practical decision of an existential 
nature: to go the partisan way or to remain fluid?
The passing of the law was sobering to many activists; it stipu-
lated that in order to register a party must have 5000 members with 
at least 300 members from 10 governorates out of the 26. In the rush 
2 http://groundtruth.in/2012/09/18/cairo-urban-grassroots/ accessed on October 27, 
2012.
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to register before parliamentary elections of October 2011, many ac-
tivists found this condition prohibitive. Although many were active 
much earlier than the uprising and had outreach to substantial con-
stituencies, none was able to secure the threshold in such a short peri-
od especially against the more established Islamist social movements 
with larger social bases and better funding. 
Although several leftist political parties were announced such 
as the old Communist Party, the Egyptian Socialist Party, the Work-
ers’ Democratic Party and the Socialist Popular Alliance Party, they 
could not register. The Workers’ Democratic Party formed by well es-
tablished activists such as Kamal Khalil, Hosam El-Hamalawy, Aida 
Seif El-Dawla and Alaa Awad, could not meet the conditions and thus 
did not register (Choucri, 2011). Meanwhile, the Socialist Popular 
Alliance Party (SPAP) emerged as a platform for diverse trends. Its 
membership consisted of defectors from the Tagammu Party, activ-
ists from the Socialist Renewal Current, Revolutionary Socialists and 
other individual sympathizers3. While SPAP was able to register, until 
October 2011 it was pending approval (Ibid.).
Unlike many Islamist and “secular” liberals, funds were a major 
constraint for most leftist activists for many reasons. Successive and 
relentless tarnishing campaigns since the 1970s have historically re-
strained fund raising initiatives. Similarly, restrictive laws regulating 
funding of non-governmental organizations have been strained after 
the uprising (Choucri, 2011). The condition set by the new political 
parties law of announcing the party program and members’list in two 
national newspapers was also prohibitive. Aware that mobilization 
through party politics is difficult in the tumultous situation after the 
uprising forced those who failed to register under the new law to form 
larger alliances sometimes with groups of compatible ideological hues 
and other times with diamterically different ones. For instance, on 11 
May 2011, the Egyptian Communist Party, the Egyptian Socialist Par-
ty, the Workers’ Democratic Party and the Socialist Popular Alliance 
Party formed the Front of Socialist Forces. On 14 August 2011, the 
Tagammu party, the Socialist Popular Alliance, the Egyptian Commu-
nist Party and the Egyptian Socialist Party in addition to a number of 
independent syndicates joined a number of liberal groups to form the 
Egyptian Bloc (Choucri, 2011). 
The difficulty is not only of funding or of the capacity to mobilize 
minimum thresholds for registration, it is rather in the transforma-
tion into a party. I have discussed above how social movements have 
3 Revolutionary Socialists website: http://www.revolutionarysocialists.org accessed 
on September 20, 2012. 
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emerged into fluid networks since the 2000s and how as such they 
were able to flexibly form alliances and jointly mobilize against the 
repressive regime. This flexibility would not be feasible when move-
ments take the formal legal stature of a political party. Brown depicts 
this challenge with reference to the The Muslim Brotherhood and its 
Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) (2012). As a movement, the The Mus-
lim Brotherhood can afford to debate their ideological bends and turns 
over a long time span and can present these changes in transient pro-
grams for societal and political change and in shifting alliances with 
other forces and movements as need arises. This flexibility is unaf-
forded to political parties, which must carefully calculate costs and 
benefits of alliances and coalitions almost around the clock. 
Another concern is the capacity to address larger constituencies. 
Social movements advocate and represent the interests of specif-
ic groups or particular issues such as students, contractual factory 
workers, housemaids etc. and many activists I observed were satis-
fied working with clearly defined sectors of the population. They were 
aware of the magnitude of organizational and financial resources re-
quired to reach out, attract and build larger constituencies i.e. com-
pete within the imperatives of electoral politics (Langohr, 2004). When 
the The Muslim Brotherhood extended their capacities into FJP, their 
organization found itself in a situation where it “does not generally 
have to give final answers to political questions. Instead, it can feint 
in several ideological and programmatic directions at once” (Brown, 
2012, p. 544). This augments the aura of secrecy that has tagged the 
organization since its years under Nasser and could jeopardize their 
public credibility. It is yet to be seen how factions of the “revolutionary 
forces” would behave as political parties in the future although history 
leaves us with grim cases such as the Social Democratic Party during 
the inter war period and more recently the Bündnes 90/Die Grünen 
(Alliance 90/The Greens) in Germany (Jahn, 1997). 
Beside established social movements and popular commit-
tees, there are thousands of interest groups who emerged to mobi-
lize around specific consumption issues such as “We want to live”, 
“We will not pay,” and “Clean Land” (Gamal, 2012). The first two are 
groups of slum dwellers organized around protesting the failures of 
the government to provide them with basic necessities, while the third 
is a protest initiative sponsored by the The Muslim Brotherhood as an 
alternative solution to the same failures. “Youths Who Love Egypt” 
is another intiative that resembles “Clean Land” yet is organized by 
students of Al-Azhar university. I observed a fine yet important distinc-
tion between these initiatives: spontneous initiatives whose members 
act independent of any sponsor usually resort to street tactics such 
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as sit-ins and strikes or tactics of last resort such as hunger strikes 
compared to sponsored initiatives who predominatly operate virtually 
through online campaigning. 
This distinction is not significant in itself as it could be tightly 
associated with the immediacy of the issue that motivated protest. 
However, the distinction is important in the reaction it induces from 
state agencies. State-run media has actively demonized spontaneious 
initiatives and protests that raise specific-demands through street tac-
tics. The spate of strikes that ensued over September and October 2012 
is particularly illustrative. Doctors, public transport workers, univer-
sity staff (not faculty members and senior administrators), students 
of Nile University, and workers in several locations across the coun-
try have striked, supported by the impressive network of independent 
professional and non-professional syndicates and uions and by their 
equally impressive independent national federations. At one level me-
dia accused protestors of disrupting daily life, at another they were 
charged of rallying behind sectoral i.e. selfish demands at critical eco-
nomic times. This is no light charge. The state-run media is accusing 
protestors of anti-nationalism, when it is exactly the failure of the state 
to provide its “nationals” with basic necessities that is being protested.
While on one side protests are more organized and strikes could 
now last longer than before the uprising and are nationally coordi-
nated as compared to site- or workplace-specific4, such accusations 
usually polarize public opinion into sympathizers and adversaries and 
divert the energies of protestors as they are pushed to explain their 
actions. For instance, in its coverage of the national strikes of public 
university staff, public transport workers and medical staff of public 
health institutions in September 2012, ON TV, a private satellite chan-
nel, interviewed Mustafa Al-Beheiry, the intern at Aga Public Health 
Unit, who had just completed five days on hunger strike. In response 
to accusations read by the host, Al-Beheiry explained the misery of 
medical staff and listed their demands which included clear budgetary 
suggestions to improve and increase public relays to the Ministry of 
Health, the restructuring of the latter and stressed that improved and 
regular salaries were the last on the list. 
In reporting on strikes, it has become standard media tactics to 
confuse protestors’ demands with their motives and to portray citizens’ 
rights as secotral claims. It forces an image of protestors as “bad” cit-
izens who disrupt and divert the energies of state officials away from 
their diligent efforts to get the economy’s wheel spinning and contrasts 
4 At the time of writing, the national strike of medical staff of public health institions 
has successfully completed its twenty-sixth day.
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them with a hollow image of “good” citizens who are patient and con-
tent with what the great Egyptian revolution has achieved. It is howev-
er dangerous because it forces the public to see activists - who are part 
of the public, thus to see - itself in opposites of good or bad and impos-
es an artificial stereotyping unto diversity and multiplicity thus pro-
ducing an uncritical mass. It gives statesmen and government officials 
peace of mind that their persistent neglect of the protests is legitimate.
Thrusting a discourse of binaries on acitvism is nothing new. It is 
not even sheer state propaganda. It is part of the dialectic of violence 
that underlies state-society dynamics and is integral to the idea of the 
modern state. The social compact between citizens and the modern 
state regarding equality, freedom and justice is built upon the belief 
that citizens are predatory by nature and that the state is the neutral 
arbiter to set and settle boundaries (Lummis, 2010). Part of the func-
tions of the state is to divide in order to rule. This is the gist of modern 
law through which the state can classify subjects into dangerous crim-
inals, traitors, offenders, dissenters, radicals and moderates (Asad, 
2012; Nandy, 2010). It is not drastically opposed to the basic premise 
of the umma in Islamic jurisprudence in its submission to divine sov-
ereignty through the righteousness of its “wise men” who constitute 
the council of shura or consultative body (Rutherford, 2006). 
Binaries of sinners and gooddoers, of the faithful and the apos-
tates are few representations of the language of power spoken by hier-
arcial institutions where truth/power resides unequivocally with those 
on the top. This is the language spoken by all sovereign state agencies 
Egypt has known since 1952 and by most if not all faith-based social 
movements like the The Muslim Brotherhood, the Ansarul-Sunna or-
ganization and Al-Da‘wa Al-Salafiya in Alexandria.5 It is the language 
used by the deposed regime as it contrasted itself with “Islamic fun-
damentalists” and begged international acceptance as the secular pro-
tector of the region from the horrors that they could leach. This binary 
was uncritically picked up by Islamists who “In contrast, for many of 
those sympathetic to Islamist social and political currents, the most 
pressing danger to Egyptian society came in the form of rampant sec-
ularization, the erosion of the society’s Islamic character under the 
impact of Western cultural forms. This oppositional logic—either sec-
ular or religious—had long schematized the political terrain in Egypt” 
(Hirschkind, 2012, p. 2). 
Classification and forcing invididuals and groups into tight cate-
gories is a form of violence that characterised the campaigns before 
5 For a run on Salafi social movements, see http://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/
cairoreview/pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=217 
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the referendum and parliamentary elections, then informed public 
discusions of Wathiqat Al-Azhar (Al-Azhar Document) on the princi-
ples of a civil state in June 2011 and later Ali Al-Salmi’s document on 
basic constitutional principles in September 2011. The current dis-
cussion of the role of Sharʻia versus secular criminal and personal 
status laws in the draft of the new constitution6 is cast along binaries 
of “seculars” versus “fundamentalists;” defenders of the modern na-
tion state versus defenders of Islamist ideas of a state compliant with 
Divine will. 
The debates over women’s status in the draft constitution is in-
dicative. El-Mahdy7 succinctly analyzed the debate as one pitched be-
tween “defenders of divine Sharʻia” and “defenders of women’s rights” 
trapped as they are in binaries that predate the emergence of political 
Islam, yet recast colonial modernity’s basic dichotomy between tradi-
tion versus modern. A trap that blinds members of the Constitutional 
Committee - established unanimously by SCAF generals to draft the 
new constitution but rejected as unrepresentative by most “revolu-
tionary forces.” 
This violence of binary oppositions color the discourses of formal 
democratic institutions. The political parties formed after the uprising 
need to grabble with politics of exclusion and inclusion based upon 
identities. The state of uncertainty that surrounds the status of Coptic 
citizens, has been created and reproduced over time by sovereign state 
agencies. The military’s brutal killing of Coptic protestors in Maspe-
ro demonstrations in October 2011 was no anomaly. The difference 
between this incidence and earlier cases of ethnic violence under the 
deposed regime such as the explosion outside Al Qiddisseen Church in 
Alexandria on new year’s eve of 2011, is that this time the culpability 
of the state is undisguised. The removal of a regime that posed as the 
defender of “religious peace” (Asad, 2012), does not mean that the 
strategies of divide and rule is gone.
According to political opportunity theory, the potential of 
post-uprising activism to continue the struggle for bread, freedom, 
social justic and human dignity, is tied to the challenges of the oppor-
tunities openned by the formal political system. While formal institu-
tions of democracy are now openned up yet they operate according 
to the same logic as under the deposed authoritarian state system. 
This could mean two things: that activism should continue to engage 
6 For a comprehensive feedback on the draft constitution see: http://khoyout.
wordpress.com/2012/10/24/ accessed on October 24, 2012.
7 http://www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=24102012&id=2282882c-
6ba0-41d3-b18b-5f051ce960c9 accessed on October 24, 2012.
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with the dialect of violence based as it is upon binaries or it could 
disengage with it altogether and amass more resources to force funda-
mental transformation in the discources of the political system . This 
means that activism should struggle to instil a functioning state that 
provides basic necessities for its citizens and to produce a political 
sensibility that transcends binaries even the binary between state and 
its subjects. 
This was beginning to happen through the fluid networked mo-
bilizations of the Egyptian Movement for Change in the 2000s. Nev-
ertheless, “since the end of the 18-day uprising, which culminated in 
the resignation of Hosni Mubarak, divisions between the secular and 
the religious have returned and proliferated within the field of Egyp-
tian political contestation. Large street protests continued to be held, 
but they are frequently limited either to self-declared secularists or 
Islamists, with one contingent refusing to participate in the other’s 
event. This divisiveness has once again served to exaggerate differ-
ences and render the many commonalities that exist across such divi-
sions difficult to recognize. Admittedly, there are also movements in a 
contrary direction, aiming to build on the experiences of political en-
gagement and solidarity forged during the January 25 uprising to cre-
ate a new political discourse outside of secular–religious oppositions. 
The outcome of these efforts, however, is far from clear at present” 
(Hirschkind, 2012, p. 52).
Nonetheless, the following table – compiled from statistical figures 
documented chronologically by The Egyptian Center for Economic 
and Social Rights and uploaded on the center’s website Wikithawra 
(Rights, n.d.) indicates how state brutalities have increased under the 
democratically elected President Al-Sisi.
Tahrir Uprising SCAF MB – Morsi 
Rule
El-Sisi
Deaths Civilian 1022 406 399 2927
Police 49 24 52 226
Military 4 8 19 95
Total 1075 438 470 3248
Injured 16806 9228 18535
In Custody 4809 41163
Source: compiled by the author from Wikithawra 
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ANTI-PROTEST LAW AND REPRETOIRES  
OF EXPERIENCE
In November 2013, Adly Mansour, the interim President passed the 
anti-protest law which gave both the military and security police the 
right to crackdown on collective actions and gatherings and required 
Egyptians to take advance approval for holding demonstrations in 
public spaces. Immediately after the interim President passed the bill 
several protest actions took place. Protesters burned posters of the 
Minister of Defense, who was believed to run the affairs of the state 
behind Mansour and who later became the elect President in June 
2014. The photo below is downloaded from al Jazeera website and 
taken few days after the passing of the bill. 
This is not the first anti-protest law in Egypt. Earlier in 1979, 
the late President Anwar Sadat had passed a law confining student 
demonstrations to the vicinity of their respective university campuses 
(Schemm, 2003). Nonetheless, that did not deter students from pushing 
their protests out unto the squares and streets surrounding their cam-
puses. More importantly, successive rounds of anti-protest laws and 
anti-riot police practices have educated protesters on how best to push 
for physical expressions of discontentment and distress and how best 
to claim rights and make demands within tight security state regimes 
while enciting minimal retaliation and brutalities from the latter. 
Successive cycles of protests and confrontations between protest-
ers and security forces have also educated the regime on how best to 
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retaliate without causing much damage to its image as supporter of 
democratization on the international scale. Although international ex-
posure and vigilance from international organizations such as Human 
Rights Watch or Transparency International would not have been 
made possible without the forms of activism that emerged during and 
after the global anti-globalization/WTO protests and later the anti-US 
Iraq invasion protests.
The repertoires of experiences reveal themselves in two fronts. 
The first in how activists locate themselves on the continuum of forms 
of social protest and social movements. The second is in how they 
frame their opposition demands. The Egyptian Movement for Change 
or Kefaya presents us with a valid case. Since its conception as an 
opposition movement outside the formal political structures, mem-
bers of the movement understood well their ultimate goals and have 
explicitly stated them in their mandate. Those demands were clearly 
geared to end Mubarak’s regime’s monopoly over the formal political 
structure through his National Democratic Party, which he headed 
for thirty years and which his son Gamal had inherited as head of the 
Policy Committee of the same party. 
The second demand was to put an end to the protracted state 
of Emergency and its consistent renewal through adjustments to the 
Emergency Law. This demand in itself posed tremendous difficulty 
to group members when they sought to design tactics of protest on 
the ground. This was because the law itself prohibited any forms of 
public protest and subjected protesters to extreme brutalities from 
state security forces. The third unequivocal demand of Kefaya con-
cerned a set of constitutional amendments of the powers vested in 
the President, the length of his tenure, the conditions that regulated 
presidential elections and the separation of powers. Since all those de-
mands were explicitly political i.e. not anti-war or anti-globalization 
in nature, it was difficult for Kefaya members to succeed in rallying 
mass-support. 
Those demands have also given the state security forces enough 
leeway to suppress Kefaya physically through spates of “terror ar-
rests,” physical intimidation and harrassments during demonstrations 
and outright incarcerations. On occassions the regime would also or-
ganize counter demonstrations and pay to arrange massive rallies of 
purchased support. On such occasions, those rallies would cause emo-
tional damage to Kefaya members and portray the movement as weak 
thus deterring any potential support from the larger populace. Besides 
the consistent strategy of ‘divide and rule’ strategy, the strategy of mas-
sive counter rallies proved useful as proactive measrue as well as in 
terms of controlling physical protests and demonstrations. 
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Nevertheless, one of the most valuable lessons learnt during the 
short yet persistent tactics of Kefaya concerned the location, move-
ment and duration of protests, marches and demonstrations. While 
the security forces have often tried to restrict demonstrations away 
from public squares and vital roads, demonstrators learnt that it was 
possible to demonstrate in non-allowed spaces albeit in short episodes. 
They have also learnt to combine demonstrations in central squares 
with side streets of multi-million cities such as Cairo and Alexandria. 
Another valuable lesson concerned the slogans and chants. Protest-
ers learnt that explicit anti-regime slogans should be introduced after 
more regional demands such as Freedom to the Palestinians. This was 
mainly because anti-regime slogans would definitely lead to immedi-
ate brutalities. 
Another equally important lesson however, concerned the 
challenge of mobilization across ideological divides. As I stated 
above, pre-uprising activism have thrived on fluidity, flexibility and 
cross-ideological coalitions between Islamists, Leftists, Secularists 
and Nationalists. This has not been without challenges. One of those 
challenges concerned respect of words and promises on the part of 
different parties in the coalition. Prior to the uprising and during the 
Source: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/04/activists-defy-egypt-anti-protest-law-2014426232020322134.html
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eighteen days of Tahrir Square, supporters and members of the Mus-
lim Brotherhood were active in street demonstrations. This proximity 
has allowed various activists to note various methods of mobilization 
and leadership. It has also revealed important manners of collective 
action. The latter proved valuable in post-uprising activism. More pre-
cisely, it has contributed to self-imposed actually existing divide and 
rule among factions of activism. 
In conclusion, post-uprising activism has evolved within a polit-
ical system that is simultaneously “open” compared to pre-uprising 
eras and characterized by conspicuous antagonism between members 
of the elite (The Muslim Brotherhood, SCAF and “dregs”) – at least 
during the transition to a civilian government. Nevertheless, once in 
charge SCAF and later the The Muslim Brotherhood resorted to the 
same old school of repression through direct violence and social con-
trol of protest by deploying plainclothes security personnel to beat 
and dispense crowds and by public demonization of protest through 
restrict legislation and the media. Theories of resource mobilization 
and relative deprivation argued that such measures will eventually 
increase frustration and push activism to radicalize (cf Beinin and 
Vairel (2011) and Bayat (2005) criticism of “relative deprivation “ the-
ory. ; the degree of repression and radicalization are gauged only by 
the perceived threat and opportunities on the part of both the state 
and activists. The question then becomes: Are we expecting another 
uprising similar in magnitude or stealth fundamental change or a re-
turn to normalization of oppression? 
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HUNGER STRIKE:  
SELF-EMULATION ACTIVISM
“The revolution did not create its modern prince, whereas the enemies of 
the revolution possessed multiple princes. They played the game of his-
tory cleverly; the same game that we did not care to understand its rules. 
They were able to stop Time; we did not learn how to move it. It is ‘nat-
ural’ then that coming back to consciousness from anesthesia turns into 
despair.. into withdrawal symptoms .. victory is not inevitable comrades.. 
the revolution is not – by its nature – continuous. Today police arrests 
you for protesting. Today your parents inform you that your clothes and 
staying out late are the real causes of sexual harassment … I look at the 
historical destruction that accumulated in front of us with resentful and 
scared eyes .. I desire to act but I do not know how .. and I do not notice 
any glimpse of the future towards which I walk, against my will, giving 
it my back not my front” Ahmed Bakr (September 9, 2014)1. With these 
words, Ahmed Bakr curtly expresses the state of mind of many young 
persons who participated in collective action and social movements over 
years and who euphorically occupied Tahrir Square repeatedly since the 
uprising. 
Few days before Bakr wrote those words, six activists, sentenced 
to periods ranging from three to 15 years in prison for violating the lat-
est anti-protest law had declared an indefinite hunger strike. Their fam-
ilies and friends joined from outside prisons and as this is written their 
1 Revsoc.me/politics/30532. Translation from Arabic to English is mine. 
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sympathizers and friends are running campaigns to mobilize support2 
However, the potential impact of hunger strike as a mode of activism on 
effecting policy change if a function of several vectors. One of the vectors 
concerns the threat that youth poses for the stability of the regime. While 
another concerns the instrumentality of youth for political campaigning 
and as vote banks. 
There was a time – immediately after the uprising – when several young 
persons volunteered in, what was then known as, popular committees. The 
latter acted as vigilance groups who performed multiple functions in the 
vacuum created by the withdrawal of police forces and traffic police from 
the streets of most cities in the aftermath of the uprising. Some commit-
tees regulated demonstrations and sit-ins in public spaces such as Tahrir 
Square throughout 2011 and well into 2012, while others ran rounds of 
street beautification in several neighborhoods. Those committees died out 
as the state gradually regained its presence on the streets and in govern-
ment offices. The momentum from the success of the uprising ignited a 
sense of belonging and empowerment among many young persons. This 
force quickly diminished under the weight of media-led criminalization of 
protests. Many young people got trapped between the urge to create and 
innovate new statehood on one hand, and media and state-sponsored bru-
talities on the other. Others were co-opted by patrons aspiring to benefit 
from the formalization of multi-party system (cf. Pratten, 2006) 
One of the vectors that are increasingly shaping the strength of youth 
and their powers to inflict change concerns societal perceptions of youth 
activism. Hunger strike has recently triggered three discourses. The first 
is framed in religious morality and claims that hunger strike is a form of 
self-emulation and could potentially lead to suicide. Two anti-religious 
practices. The person who is on hunger strike is thus an apostate or Kafir. 
The other is benign negligence on the part of the state and feloul 
or remnants of the old Mubarak regime. The third is compassionate yet 
careless as those have always been outside political participation. In a 
situation where hunger strikes have not been part of the repertoires of 
political activism (yet) and within the context of a society that has not 
flinched to daily sights of hungry citizens on urban streets and in inter-
national development reports. One is left to doubt the possible effective-
ness of hunger strike as a strategy premised as it is on inciting public 
shaming. If the ‘general public’ and the ‘state’ have rarely shown signs of 
shame over persistent poverty, hunger and violence – even under interna-
tional vigilance, how does one expect them to move now? 
2 http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/110190/Egypt/Politics-/Antiprotest-
law-activists-begin-hunger-strike-at-E.aspx 
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BEYOND ACTIVISM: VISIONS  
OF MODERN CIVIC STATEHOOD 
There is no definite answer to this question but we can begin to figure 
out the possibility of each scenario by looking at the contradictions of 
the modern (civic) nation state, the violence upon which it sustains it-
self whether in its technocratic structure, law, science, and discourses 
of economic growth and development and by looking at who are ac-
tually involved in shaping statehood or possess at least a rudimentary 
vision of statehood in Egypt now? 
Let us begin from the beginning i.e. the idea of a modern na-
tion-state. It is constructed by maintaining tight association between 
an institutional technocratic structure (the state), “organized nation-
alism, mega-science and the growth of an urban-industrial society” 
(Nandy, 2010). This association is possible only by differentiation i.e. 
the inclusion of some classes, sexes, and ethnicities and the exclusion 
and/or marginalization of others. This covers the marginalization of 
other forms of non-western, pre-colonial organizational and associa-
tional forms or freezing them into ideal types such as “oriental despo-
tism,” “tribalism,” “Islamist Umma.” 
Like most of its post-colonial counterparts, Egypt has known the 
nation-state as the clue to the West’s economic and scientific power 
and the idea of a native nation-state was seen as the panacea of all 
ills. After the military coup of 1952, Nasser forced the structure of a 
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secular and technocratic state upon a sprouting yet ambiguous Islam-
ic idea of a nation. The latter was wrought by Islamic reformers and 
“modernizers” of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (Gas-
per 2009) and the The Muslim Brotherhood beginning in 1928. There is 
no doubt that neither group had formulated a tangible program for an 
Islamic alternative compared to - and partly because of his repression 
- Nasser who managed to give shape to a “native” form of a modern 
state albeit contradictory and dysfunctional (particularly after the de-
feat against the Israeli-British forces in 1967).
With regards to activism, Nasser’s charisma and nationalist dis-
position, helped nurture “indigenous” versions of socialism and an 
avant guard – mostly from the middle classes who were supposedly 
well versed in the discourses of the modern nation state and capable 
of instilling their political sensibility upon the rest. Contrary to Marx 
version of historical development, the vanguards failed to “wither 
away” the state to which they owe their existence and instead spent 
most of their active lives in its jails. They failed to mold a state of free-
dom, equality, justice and dignity however defined. 
Members of the leftist intelligentsia were given one blow after 
another. From the failure of the Nasserist project to the open door (In-
fitah) policy of his successor Anwar Sadat. Sadat leached the Islamists 
to fight the Nasserists. More damaging, he supported their ascension 
to the apex of the economy. “A substantial faction of the Infitah class 
had an Islamist cast. By 1980, elders of eight out of eighteen families 
who dominated Egypt’s private sector affiliated themselves with the 
The Muslim Brotherhood. Economic enterprises linked to the organi-
zation - many concentrated in real estate and currency speculation, 
Islamic banking channeling workers’ remittances - may have consti-
tuted as much as 40 percent of the private sector” (Beinin, 2005, p. 
120). Three of the general guides, murshid of the organization came 
from wealthy families namely, Hasan Al-Hudaiby, Umar Al-Tilmisany 
and Mustafa Mashhour (Ibid.). 
The story of his assassination on the hands of the Islamists has 
been well documented (Bayat, 2007) but upon his death, the Egyp-
tian nation state had to contend with a militant political Islam and a 
weakened leftism. The activism of the vanguards of Nasser days had 
hibernated only to “atomize” under Mubarak. Under the latter, the 
Egyptian state had no space for leftist intellectuals especially in light 
of the disintegration of leftist formal organizations and repression by 
the deposed regime. The remaining leftist political party was “vam-
pired” by internal strife and the hegemony of the Political Party Com-
mittee (Stacher J. A., 2004). The leftists’ desire to maintain a feeling of 
independence has driven them to the line of least resistance by writing 
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opinion columns in state-run press or holding discussions in private 
locations and writing fiction (Duboc, 2011). 
The deposed state also had no place for militant Islamists, who 
after succeeding to deter what they called “secular” forces through 
a series of assassinations and attacks across the country had been 
clamped down by the pervasive security apparatuses and prolong the 
rule of emergency (Bayat, 2007). Incidentally, many of those militants 
were pardoned and released from prisons after the election of Mu-
hammed Morsi, the new president in 2012. They have now formed 
formal political wings such as the Jama’a Islamiya. By the early 2000s 
the Egyptian state has been successfully Islamized. Religion has be-
come integral to the “indigenous” nation-state and to formal politics. 
Besides Al-Azhar, Ministry of Endowments and other religious 
sovereign state agencies, religions is shaping the “indigenous” nation 
state like never before. Whether through the Renaissance Project of 
the Muslim Brotherhood or through contestations of Sharia in the 
constitutional committee by members of the Salafi front, the Islamist 
has recently emerged as the only fragment of vision of a nation state 
and as the contestant against equally loose visions of the Nasserist, 
leftist, and socialists (the popular front) or the non-Islamist liberals 
who believe in capital (the bloc). The latter forces and trends are now 
forming the coalitions and fronts that I discussed above even though 
they are not internally coherent. 
What plagues the left plagues the rest and lies in the contradictions 
of what everybody seeks from the modern nation state. The Movement 
for Academic Independence is a glaring example (will elaborate later). 
The Islamists are pushing for a nation state that aligns with what they 
perceive as the essence of the Islamic way of life and the “authentic 
soul of the Egyptian family” as stated in the draft constitution released 
in October 2012, while the liberals seek a state that best reflects the 
middle class aspirations of “life style” modeled around western no-
tions of freedom and human rights. The leftists in their zeal to connect 
to the larger masses try to argue for a state that delivers basic necessi-
ties for human survival. 
 While fragments of diverse incomplete visions of the modern 
nation state manifest in ideological debates in the media, the par-
liament and headquarters of new-founded political parties, workers, 
peasants, the unemployed and the under employed are fighting their 
own battle on the streets through vibrant, protracted and nationally 
well organized strikes and sit-ins. They zealously establish and run 
independent syndicates, unions and federations to have direct “voice” 
oblivious of the law that attempts to ban it (labor law of 2003). It is a 
fundamental change that has already succeeded through the uprising 
106
ThE ARMy, ThE MuSlIM BRoThERhooD & ThE REST In EgyPT PoST 2011
to prize open the institution of the presidency, nothing less. Their vi-
sion of the Egyptian statehood seems to be drawn in direct contrast 
to the “specialized coercive apparatus [and] private business venture” 
(Nandy, 2010, p. 295) that was the state under the previous regimes. It 
is also and at once a class struggle. The radicalization of the demands 
and of protests posed existential questions to all activists on the ideo-
logical battle field. 
Going back to the question of possible scenarios, it is clear that the 
answer lies in the extent of the marginalized to continue the struggle 
against the nation state and harness their experiential repertoires of 
recent mobilizations, muster the organic leadership and the “density 
of the social networks that have been mobilized” in order to “generate 
sufficient mutual trust to overcome decades of fear instilled by author-
itarian regimes (Beinin and Vairel, 2011, Kindle Edition). Nandy has 
previously underscored how the paradox of the nation state “has en-
sured that organized political power cannot easily be mobilized, even 
in the Southern world, to resist the pathologies of the modern state. 
Citizens are perpetually trapped in a duality vis-à-vis the state; the 
elites are domesticated and banalized by excess and largess while the 
marginalized are criminalized. Either the resistance has to come from 
the fringes of the polity or it has to legitimize itself in the language of 
the mainstream. The vested interests which have grown up around 
the idea of the modern state define, thus, not merely the mainstream 
but also most of the popular concepts of dissent. Ashish Nandy (2010) 
It is also their capacity to sustain their presence on the streets 
and in forums while constantly aware of free riders. Writing from an 
activist perspective, Anne Alexander exhorts the left to grasp the po-
litical and organizational opportunities opened up by the exposure 
of the Islamists that has resulted from establishing a formal political 
system, “It is worth reflecting on how a lack of understanding of the 
nature of mass Islamist organizations, and the social contradictions 
within them, could have sent left wing activists [….] into the trap of 
pursuing an abstract political battle with the Brotherhood framed 
around the question of “Islamism” versus “secularism” instead of de-
veloping a strategy of using the social struggle in order to deepen the 
Brotherhood’s internal political crisis, and thus give the left time to 
build and organize. (Alexander, International Socialism, 2012). It is 
through the struggles of the people and continuous interactions that 
people will begin to realize that the “ideological pronouncements can 
be analyzed as effects and not predictors of [leaders’] political experi-
ences” (El-Gobashy, 2005, p. 375). There is definitely the threat of so-
cial fatigue and demobilization. Charles Tilly’s (1978) idea that people 
mobilize more easily and quickly if they perceive a threat as opposed 
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to opportunities is definitely valid but it fails to account for the situ-
ation of despair and the state where people have nothing else to lose. 
What the above analysis of activism has attempted to demon-
strate is that in Egypt, there was at least three warring democracies in 
the past three years. Despite claims that Egyptians are still trapped in 
pre-democratic traditions and that they are still unfit for democracy 
– an argument that the deposed Mubarak repeatedly made to consoli-
date his dictatorship and to ensure what he termed ‘stability.’1 Nobody 
could ever deny that the experiences of public participation in politics 
and activism since the early years of the twenty-first century left a 
mark on a large swathe of the population – including non-resident 
Egyptians. In terms of electoral organization and turn-out, the three 
referendums on the constitution in 2011, 2012, and 2014 in addition 
to two Presidential election and one Parliamentary election – all have 
passed international inspection and approval testify to the capacity of 
the Egyptian population to practice that form of democracy. 
However, democracy cannot be reduced to electoral forms only. 
The modes and trajectory of activism presented above, have also sen-
sitized activists and their networks of friends, families and acquain-
tances over issues of differences of opinions and beliefs. The euphoric 
experiences of the uprising itself were exemplary moments of demo-
cratic participation. When viewed historically, the fact that when the 
Muslim Brotherhood came to power, they facilitated free elections. 
When General Abdul Fattah El-Sisi opted to run for Presidency, he 
went through fair and democratic elections. The insistence of young 
people to protest peacefully or resort to hunger strikes. All these pat-
terns unequivocally indicate that Egyptians do not lack democratic 
sense. Rather, they seem to have experienced three – not a single form 
of democracy, albeit the three are at logger heads; they are warring 
democracies. 
It seems that when demonstrators in Tahrir Square improvised 
the song that went viral on the internet chanting, “our rights are para-
mount and hunger does not bother us anymore,” they were setting the 
threshold of their struggles. Even though they were uncertain about 
their steps towards a civic state that delivers their demands. Yet, isn’t 
“the spirit of liberty is the spirit that is not too certain it is right[?]” 
(Bogart, 2007, Kindle Edition).
1 http://www.youm7.com/story/2013/11/20/%D9%84%D8%A7_%D9%8A%D8%B5%
D9%84%D8%AD_%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1_%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%89_
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%89!/1355138#.VBH5iWfYeP8
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APPENDIX:  
ECONOMIC PROFILE OF EGYPT  
FROM 2011-2014*
The tables above and below show a select set of economic indicators 
of the Egyptian economy over the three years 2011-2013
Crops in Agriculture- cotton, rice, corn, wheat, beans, fruits, veg-
etables; cattle, water buffalo, sheep, goats.
Major Industries- textiles, food processing, tourism, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, hydrocarbons, construction, cement, metals, light 
manufactures.
Primary Exports- crude oil and petroleum products, cotton, tex-
tiles, metal products, chemicals, processed food.
Countries- India, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Libya, USA - Italy 
Highest (7.9%), Libya Lowest (4.9%).
Primary Imports- machinery and equipment, foodstuffs, chemi-
cals, wood products, fuels.
Countries- China, USA, Germany, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, Italy 
(In descending order - 9.5%-5%).
Public Expenditure
Value & Rank $ 80.4 Billion Ranked at 38 in terms of 
global expenditure
* https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html
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Last 10 years growth  665 (%)
Egypt during the Great 
Recession
$ 39.5 Billion 
Egypt since the end of the 
Great Recession
Negative Growth of 39.5%
Egypt during the 2011 
Egyptian revolution
 Negative Growth of 58.5%
Egypt since the end of the 
2011 revolution
 Positive Growth of 198%
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South-South Program
In Egypt, becoming a civic state that provides its citizens’ demands for 
“Bread, Freedom, Social Justice and Human Dignity” is a protracted 
process. a process that depends on many factors and actors. The nature 
of this process, whether democratic or otherwise, is a function of multiple 
forces and interests of local, national, regional and international scales. 
This study is an attempt to analyze and explain this process.
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